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There are forty-five volumes of transcript in this case.
Throughout his appellate briefs, Mr. Menzies will refer to the
volumes from the new trial proceedings by record cite as follows:
1164

December 4, 1989 Motion for New
Trial

1934

February 6, 1990

1166

March 9, 1990 evidentiary hearing
(new trial)

1185

March 23, 1990 evidentiary hearing

1935

May 10, 1990

1936

June 4, 1990

1186

July 6, 1990 clarification of
ruling

1188

September 17, 1990

1189

September 24, 1990

1190

October 22, 1990

1191

November 7, 1990
November 15, 1990

1931

December 3, 4 and 5, 1990
reconstruction hearing

R. 1932

December 19, 1990

The notereader prepared the volumes of transcript
covering the actual trial.
numbered 1 through 3275.
certified by Ms. Lee.

There are eleven volumes which are

These volumes are the original transcript

The trial judge labeled them as the "original

ix

transcript" and throughout this brief, Mr. Menzies refers to them as
the "original transcript" or original version.
During the proceedings in California, Ms

Lee read from

her shorthand notes while defense counsel and a representative for
the State read along from copies of the original version.

The

representatives noted any discrepancies between the shorthand notes
and the original version by writing in changes on the original
version.

The eleven volumes of transcript wherein defense counsel

denoted the discrepancies is also part of the official record in
this case and contains transcript pages 1 through 3275.
The trial court labeled these volumes containing
discrepancies which are written in by hand as the "California"
transcript.

Mr. Menzies refers to these volumes throughout his

briefs as the California version or transcript.
A cite to T. in this brief is a cite to a transcript page
in the California version.

Mr. Menzies7 arguments can best be

understood by referring to the California version.
A cite to O.T. is a cite to the original transcript.
The following volumes of transcript also exist:
R. 1165

May 16, 1986 lineup proceedings

R. 1164

January 11, 1988 Motion for
Discovery

R. 1149

February 18 and 19, 1988 Walter
Britton's testimony (transcribed
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R. 1150

May 19, 1988 preliminary hearing
transcript

x

R. 1163

November 20-21, 1988 Motion to
Suppress

R. 1196

January 25, 1988 and March 3, 1988
Motion for Discovery, other motions

R. 567

Dr. Sweeney preliminary hearing

R. 1163

November 7, 1986 evidentiary
hearing on Motion to Suppress,
Carlton Way transcript
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 880161
Priority No. 1

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(h) (1953 as amended); see also Rule 26(2) (a)
and (b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
See Addendum A for text of statutes, rules and
constitutional provisions.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Do the Court Reporters and Stenographers Act and Utah

Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) require that a transcript be prepared by a
Utah certified court reporter or that the parties stipulate to the
use of an uncertified reporter in order to use a transcript prepared
by an uncertified individual for mandatory review of a capital
homicide case?
2.

Is mandatory review impossible since an accurate,

verbatim transcript does not exist?
a)

Does the State have the burden of establishing

the accuracy of the transcript?
b)

Is either the "California" or "original" version

an accurate, verbatim reflection of what occurred in the
trial court?
c)

Is reversal required since an adequate

transcript for mandatory review is not available?
3.

Is prejudice required, and, if so, did it exist in

4.

Would the eighth and fourteenth amendments be

this case?

violated by use of either version of the transcript?
5.

Would Mr. Menzies7 right to appeal under the Utah

Constitution be violated by use of either version of the transcript?
6.

Would Mr. Menzies' right to due process and equal

protection under the Utah Constitution be violated by use of the
transcript?
7.

Would use of either version of the transcript violate

Mr. Menzies7 rights to due process, equal protection, and effective
assistance under the federal constitution?
8.

Did ex parte supplementation of the record by the

prosecutor violate Utah statutory and constitutional rights and
federal constitutional rights?
These issues involve questions of law for
this court; a correction of error standard is
applicable. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d
326, 327 (Utah 1989). The trial judge's
factual finding that numerous errors exist and
other factual findings underlying his
conclusions are given deference. See State v.
Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an Amended Information dated March 7, 1986, the State
charged Mr. Menzies with Aggravated Kidnapping, Aggravated Robbery
- 2 -

and Habitual Criminal, all first degree felonies, and Capital
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital offense.1
Mr. Menzies filed a timely Notice of appeal directly
appealing his convictions and sentence to this Court.

R. 1108. On

November 15, 1989, prior to filing his opening brief, Mr. Menzies
filed a "Motion to Set Aside Judgment and/or for New Trial" in the
trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the transcript of
proceedings prepared in this case did not accurately reflect what
occurred in court and was not adequate for review of this capital
homicide case.

R. 1222-1226; see Addendum B for copy of

Mr. Menzie's Motion.
On January 3, 1990, this Court ordered that the trial
court hear and decide Defendant7s Motion to Set Aside
Judgment . . . , conduct proceedings pursuant to Rule 11(h), Utah
Rules of the Supreme Court2, and decide all issues relating to the

1 The aggravating circumstances alleged as part of the
capital homicide charge which were submitted to the jury were that
"the homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing,
or attempting to commit: Aggravated Robbery and/or Robbery and
Aggravated Kidnapping and/or Kidnapping." R. 51-54; 845. The jury
found Mr. Menzies guilty of Capital Homicide with the aggravating
circumstances that the homicide was committed while in the
commission of a robbery and an aggravated kidnapping. R. 898. The
jury also convicted Mr. Menzies of Aggravated Kidnapping but found
him not guilty of Aggravated Robbery. R. 899, 900.
The original transcript incorrectly reported a guilty
verdict on the Aggravated Robbery charge. The error has been
corrected by stipulation of the parties. T. 2693.
2

These rules have since been changed to the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

- 3 -

transcript and court reporter.

See Addendum C.3

On June 4, 1990, the trial judge issued a ruling which
was not clear to the parties. 4

R. 1704; R. 1936:3-23.

Thereafter,

the trial judge issued a Memorandum Decision clarifying his ruling.
R. 1724-8.

A copy of this Memorandum Decision is contained in

Addendum D.5
On December 3, 1990, the court held an evidentiary
hearing during which Mr. Menzies presented evidence regarding the
errors in the transcript and the prejudicial effect of such errors.
R. 1931:16-183.

The State presented no evidence at that hearing.

R. 1931:183.
On December 19, 1991, the parties and the trial judge
attempted to reconstruct what occurred in the more than 3 300 pages
of transcript.

The parties and the judge ultimately agreed that the

attempts to reconstruct the record were futile and that Mr. Menzies

3

On December 8, 1989, Mr. Menzies filed in this Court
his proposed modifications pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Supreme Court. Mr. Menzies' proposals, the State's response
thereto, and Mr. Menzies7 reply were later resubmitted to the trial
court and decided by the trial judge. R. 1829-40. A second round
of proposed modifications was submitted on December 17, 1990.
R. 1818-26.
4

On June 8, 1990, after the trial judge ruled,
Mr. Menzies filed a Motion to Reconsider Ruling (R. 1705-9,
1718-23). Following various hearings in the trial court,
Mr. Menzies also filed an additional Memorandum in Support of his
Motion . . . for New Trial. R. 1572-1607.
5

The trial court ordered that a representative from
each party travel to California to meet with the court reporter and
go over her shorthand notes. R. 1776, 1778. The representatives
spent three weeks reviewing the notes and inserting discrepancies
between those notes and the original version in the original version
of the transcript. R. 1931:26. Although Ms. Lee was sworn when she
testified, she was never sworn as part of the notereading process.
- 4

-

had made all reasonable efforts to reconstruct the proceedings.
R. 1932:78-9, 82; R. 1192-3.
The trial court denied Defendant's Motion for New Trial
and sent two sets of transcripts to this Court.

The Order stated:

1. Defendant's Renewed Motion to Set
Aside Judgment and/or for New Trial is denied.
2. The original transcript, prepared
by the notereader, shall be transmitted to the
Utah Supreme Court based upon the finding that
transcript is sufficiently accurate to afford
defendant a full and fair review of his issues
to be raised on appeal.
3. The California transcript,
interlineated by defendant's counsel and
containing Ms. Tauni Lee's version of her
reporter notes, shall also be transmitted to
the Utah Supreme Court as part of the record on
appeal.
R. 1192-3.

See Addendum E for a copy of the Order.
Pursuant to an Order of this Court dated February 20,

1991, Mr. Menzies is raising in this brief only issues relating to
the adequacy of the transcript.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

THE TRANSCRIPT ISSUE

Tauni Lee, the court reporter assigned to Judge Uno's
courtroom at the time of this trial (February 10 through March 23,
1988), was appointed as Judge Uno's official reporter on January 14,
1988, twenty-seven days before this trial began.

See Defendant's

Exhibit 4; R. 1166:29. Ms. Lee had never applied for nor been
licensed to act as a court reporter in the State of Utah.
R. 1166:9, 138, 158; Affidavit of George Weiler, Defendant's Exhibit
(hereinafter "D.E.") 1; R. 1166:29, 31.

- 5 -

(Addendum F)

In April, 1987, ten months before the trial in the
present case, Ms. Lee's California license expired and became
delinquent.

D.E. 2, Affidavit of Rick Black (contained in

Addendum G ) . 6
During the six months prior to Ms. Lee's employment in
district court, she resided in Utah, working for two weeks as a
temporary secretary at Brigham Young University and later as private
reporter for Associated Merit Court Reporters.

R. 1166:106, 131-5,

182-30; 1185:15.
Linda Van Tassell, the owner of Associated Merit and a
recognized court reporter with numerous credentials including her
current position as president of the Utah Association of Court
Reporters, testified that Ms. Lee worked at Associated Merit for
approximately six weeks as a freelance court reporter from early
September to October 15, 1987. R. 1185:5-6, 14-15.

Ms. Lee did

nine jobs for Ms. Van Tassell; the quality was so poor in each case
that Ms. Van Tassell sent every product back to Ms. Lee for
corrections.

R. 1185:15-6.

The problems with Ms. Lee's work

encompassed difficulties in taking accurate notes as well as in
reading those notes after taking them.

6

R. 1185:17. The transcripts

The number "6770" which Ms. Lee included in each of
the "certifications" contained in the original transcript is not a
number issued by the State of Utah and was the number issued to her
by the State of California in July, 1985. R. 1166:99, 12, 123;
D.E. 2. See Addendum G.
In November, 1987, Ms. Lee obtained a non-tested R.P.R.
designation; the issuing agency gave this designation to her based
upon her California license even though the California license was
delinquent and had lapsed at the time Ms. Lee obtained the R.P.R.
certificate. R. 1673; D.E. 2.

- 6 -

prepared by Ms. Lee contained "total inconsistent errors throughout"
and customers complained about the quality of the work.
R. 1185:16-17.
According to Ms. Van Tassell, Ms. Lee's work was so poor
that she was not capable of reporting a capital homicide case
(R. 1185:20); Ms. Van Tassell told Ms. Lee that she would never make
it as a court reporter.

R. 1166:133; R. 1185:20-1.

After Ms. Lee was fired from the job in Third District
Court in September, 1988, she applied for employment with Rocky
Mountain Court Reporters; she did not tell Rocky Mountain that she
had worked in Third District Court.

R. 1185:45-6.

Ms. Lee covered three depositions for Rocky Mountain.
R. 1166:48. Ms. Lee prepared the first transcript from a videotaped
deposition of a doctor; it contained such significant errors and
omissions when compared to the videotape that Rocky Mountain
terminated her.

R. 1185:46, 47, 49, 50. The transcript was redone

by another reporter and was ten to fifteen percent longer when
corrected by the other reporter.

R. 1185:48,49.7

Although Susan Hellberg Young, the president of Rocky
Mountain, was a reluctant witness for Mr. Menzies who appeared
pursuant to a subpoena, she nevertheless testified that knowing what
she did about Ms. Lee's work, she would not have her report a

7

When Rocky Mountain terminated Ms. Lee, she had not
yet completed transcripts from the other two depositions she had
taken. R. 1185:49. Ms. Young had difficulty getting the two
transcripts from Ms. Lee; Ms. Lee ultimately "skipped town" and
Rocky Mountain was forced to use a notereader to prepare the other
two transcripts. R. 1185:49.

- 7 -

capital homicide case.

R. 1185:53.

On April 13, 1988, after the trial in the instant case
had occurred, but before the transcripts were prepared, California
declared Ms. Lee incompetent to act as a court reporter in that
state.

R. 1166:66-7; D.E. 2; D.E. 5, 9 (contained in Addendum H ) .

That declaration of incompetency has never been lifted, and the
State of California has recently revoked Ms. Lee's license to act as
a court reporter in that state.

R. 1166:66; D.E. 2, 3, 4 from

December 3, 1990 hearing (Addendum I).

Orders to Show Cause and

sanctions were issued against Ms. Lee in at least four other cases.
Id.; R. 1845.8
By May 11, 1988, Ron Gibson, Deputy Court Administrator
for the State of Utah, was aware that Ms. Lee had been declared
incompetent by the California court.

D.E. 11; R. 1166:65-6.

On May 17, 1988, Mr. Gibson sent a memorandum to various
people in the judicial system, informing them that Ms. Lee had told
Geoffrey Butler, the clerk of this Court, that it would take her
nine months to complete the transcript in the present case and that
she planned to resign in the next two months and move to Europe with
her husband.

R. 1166:67; D.E. 6 (Addendum J).

The memorandum also

indicated that a number of people had expressed a "grave concern11
about Ms. Lee's ability to complete the transcript, and that all

8

Ms. Lee ultimately prepared the transcripts in those
four cases during the period of time in which the court
administrator's office had placed her on leave, in violation of
judicial council rule, to prepare the transcripts in the present
case. R. 1166:69, 179.
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efforts, including the suspension of administrative rules, should be
Id.9

made to insure that Ms. Lee completed the transcript.

As the result of concerns about Ms. Lee completing the
Menzies transcripts, the Court Administrator's office placed Ms. Lee
on administrative leave for the weeks of May 23, June 6, June 20,
July 4, and July 15, 1988, so that she could work full time during
those weeks on preparation of the Menzies transcripts.
continued to receive her full salary while on leave.

She

R. 1166:69,

70.10
On August 10, 1988, in response to a request by Ms. Lee
for an extension of time in which to file the transcripts in this
case, Geoff Butler wrote Ms. Lee a letter indicating that if she did
not complete the Menzies transcript by September 6, 1988, she was to
appear in this Court for an Order to Show Cause hearing on that
date.

R. 1166:78; D.E. 13.
On August 29, 1988, in a letter signed by Judge Uno and

Timothy Shea, Ms. Lee was informed of the "increased concern
surrounding [her] ability to complete the transcript of State v.

9

Ms. Lee estimated at that time, based on the length of
her shorthand notes, that the transcript would be approximately 5000
pages. R. 1166:68; Addendum J. The transcript ultimately filed by
her was approximately 3 3 00 pages.
10

The deadline with this Court for filing the
transcripts was July 23, 1988, and the administrative leave plan was
instituted in an effort to meet that deadline. R. 1166:72. On
May 23, 1988, Ms. Lee informed Ron Gibson that she had broken her
finger doing karate with her husband and would need to be on sick
leave for three weeks through June 10, 1988. R. 1166:72-3; D.E. 8.
At about the same time, Ron Gibson assigned a temporary court
reporter to Judge Uno's courtroom. R. 1166:73.
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Menzies in a timely manner."

R. 1166:75; D.E. 14 (Addendum K ) . 1 1

At that time, Ms. Lee was relieved of her assignment to
Judge Uno until she completed the transcript in this case.
R. 1166:75.

She was ordered to report to the Court Administrator's

office and work under the direct supervision of Ron Gibson until the
transcript was complete.

R. 1166:75-6; see D.E. 14 (Addendum K ) .

On August 30, 1988, Ron Gibson met with Ms. Lee and
discussed the difficulties with her job performance.

R. 1166:77.

During that conversation, Ms. Lee informed Mr. Gibson that she was
close to completing the Menzies transcript, that she needed to work
at home because she used a computer to prepare the transcript and
requiring her to move the computer would only result in further
delay. 12

As a result of Ms. Lee's statement, Ron Gibson allowed her

to continue working at home rather than under his direct
supervision.

R. 1166:77; D.E. 15 (Addendum K ) .

By September 7, 1988, Ms. Lee filed the Menzies
transcripts.

She also returned the district court record "which she

had checked out . . . for the purpose of verifying names and

11

The letter indicates that she did not appear at the
courthouse for supervision, had frequent absences when she was
supposed to be in court, and that her actions had "become an
unacceptable burden upon your judge, fellow court reporters, and the
court executive." See Addendum K. Other problems included
confrontations with court staff and violation of the security
policy. R. 1166:77; Addendum K containing D.E. 15.
12

After testifying that a notereader prepared the
transcripts in this case and that Ms. Lee did not use her computer
in the preparation of the Menzies transcripts, Ms. Lee denied that
she had told Ron Gibson that she needed to stay at home because she
utilized her computer. R. 1166:178. Ron Gibson testified to this
statement, however, and it is repeated in an official memorandum
from the Court Administrator's office dated August 30, 1988.
R. 1166:77; D.E. 15 (Addendum K ) .
- 10 -

dates."

Personnel file, D.E. 4.

Apparently no one who was involved

in Ms. Lee's employment supervision checked the transcript for
accuracy or completeness.

R. 1166:85.

On September 7, 1988, Judge Uno and Timothy Shea sent
Ms. Lee a letter terminating her employment immediately.
R. 1166:79; D.E. 16 (Addendum L).
Following Ms. Lee's termination, defense counsel
discovered that Ms. Lee had not prepared portions of the record and
made numerous unsuccessful attempts to locate Ms. Lee prior to
filing the Motion to Set Aside Judgment in this case.
R. 1166:66-74. Although Ms. Lee testified under oath that she did
not know that "Legal Defenders"13 was looking for her
(R. 1166:169-71), she had spoken to the Legal Defender secretary on
November 4, 1988, promising to call back that week after checking
some dates, and had also been told by LaVonne Nadeau, Judge Uno's
clerk, that Legal Defenders was looking for her.

R. 1185:70;

R. 1485.
Ms. Lee testified that although she took the notes in
court, she did not prepare the transcripts which were submitted to
the court, nor did she read them for accuracy after a notereader and
proofreader prepared them.

R. 1166:108, 174-7, 178. Ms. Lee did

look at pages that the notereader had paperclipped and made any
changes that she noticed.

She did not thereafter check to make sure

that the notereader had made her changes, nor did she read the
entire transcript.

R. 1166:173-7.

13

Both trial and appellate counsel for Mr. Menzies are
employed by the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.
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B.

THE TRIAL

On the evening of Sunday, February 23, 1986, Maureen
Hunsaker was working as an attendant at a Gas-A-Mat in Kearns.
T. 978-9.

At a little before 10:00 p.m., a customer discovered that

Ms. Hunsaker was not present at the booth.

T. 1030, 982. Two days

later, a hiker discovered her body in the Storm Mountain picnic
area.

T. 1304.
Tim Larabee and Beth Brown were two young people who had

briefly seen a man and a woman at Storm Mountain on the morning of
February 24, 1986.

T. 1193, 1197-9, 1200-2, 1215.

The distance at

which they viewed the pair is unclear due to the errors in this
transcript.

T. 1198, 1200, 1220.

Neither Tim nor Beth identified Mr. Menzies as the man
they had seen at Storm Mountain at the lineup, the preliminary
hearing, or trial.

T. 1276-9.14

At the lineup, Tim and Beth

identified two different people as being the man they saw.

T. 1274,

1277-8.15
At trial, Tim claimed that after the lineup, while
walking with the prosecutor back to the County Attorney's office, he
asked prosecutor Ernie Jones if he had been wrong and if the right
person was Number 6.

T. 1284-5. Number 6 was Mr. Menzies.

T. 1285.

14

Beth did not testify for the State at trial; the
defense called her to establish that she had selected someone else
without hesitation at the lineup. T. 2251.
15

Neither expressed any hesitation about their lineup
identifications at the time of the lineup, even though they had been
instructed that they did not need to select anyone and to indicate
on the card that they were not sure of the selection if that were
the case. Transcript of Lineup Proceedings, hereinafter "T.L.P.,11
12-13; T. 1276-8; T. 2251.
- 12 -

The State had not informed defense counsel of this
incident, even though the lineup occurred prior to the preliminary
hearing in this case and almost two years before trial.
1296, 1301.

T. 1295,

Defense counsel first learned of this conversation when

Tim testified to it on redirect examination during trial.

Id.

The

trial court granted Mr. Menzies' motion to strike the testimony
(which had already been heard by the jury) but refused to grant his
motion for mistrial.

T. 1299, 1301-2, 1313-4.

In violation of pretrial orders which precluded evidence
of Mr. Menzies7 criminal history, Detective Thompson testified
during direct examination that Mr. Menzies told him that Mr. Menzies
had gone to the parole office on the day before Ms. Hunsaker's body
was found.

R. 780; T. 1877. Defense counsel made several motions

for mistrial based on this testimony.

T. 1878, 1904, 1922, 1946,

1948, 2133. Nevertheless, the original version of the transcript
indicates that Detective Thompson stated "patrol" not "parole."
T. 1877. 16
Walter Britton, a jail house "snitch," testified against
Mr. Menzies at the preliminary hearing.

T. 2080-84.17

At trial,

16

This error has been changed by stipulation of the
parties. An error depicting Officer Iovino as a "parole" officer
when he is, in fact, a "patrol" officer has also been corrected by
stipulation to show that Thompson actually stated "parole" office.
T. 1869, 1877.
17

Mr. Britton did not contact authorities until a month
after the alleged conversation; his testimony did not contain any
details or information that he could not have gleaned from the
extensive media coverage of this case; a portion of his statement
reflected media coverage which had been incorrect.
In December, 1985, immediately prior to the alleged
(continued)
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Mr. Britton was questioned outside the presence of the jury and
stated that he would not testify.
specific questions asked of him.

T. 960. However, he answered any
T. 1081.

The trial judge determined that Mr. Britton was
unavailable and, over defense objection, allowed Mr. Britton to be
returned to prison without appearing in front of the jury; the trial
judge then allowed Mr. Britton7s testimony from the preliminary
hearing to be read to the jury by court personnel.

T. 2078.

Various portions of the transcript regarding this issue are
unintelligible or do not accurately reflect what was said in court.
See discussion, infra at 27-9; 32-36.
Numerous other errors occurred during the guilt/innocence
and penalty phases of Mr. Menzies' trial which require reversal.

In

an effort to give this Court a brief overview of the case,
Mr. Menzies has attached as Addendum M a draft of the proposed Table
of Contents in this case, as it currently exists. While Mr. Menzies
may raise additional issues not listed in this table if ultimately
required to brief this case in full, the table outlines a number of
issues for this Court's information.
After a jury convicted Mr. Menzies of Capital Homicide,
Mr. Menzies waived the jury for the penalty phase of his trial.
Judge Uno sentenced Mr. Menzies to death.

In constructing the

(footnote 17 continued)
conversation with Mr. Menzies, Mr. Britton had undergone a
court-ordered psychological examination. T. 1081, 2043-4. During
the twenty months following the preliminary hearing, Mr. Britton
vacillated several times as to whether he would testify at trial.
T. 1081-82.
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transcript of the judge's sentencing determination, the notereader
used the trial judge's handwritten notes which he had reviewed while
pronouncing judgment to interpret the court reporter's notes.
R. 1929:46.
Mr. Menzies has no other homicide convictions, and the
instant case involves a single homicide.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I.

The Court Reporters and Stenographers Act and

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) require that a transcript which is to
be used for mandatory review of a capital homicide conviction and
sentence be prepared by a Utah certified shorthand reporter.

A

transcript prepared by an individual who is not certified in Utah
cannot be used for such purposes unless the parties so stipulate.
No such stipulation exists in this case.
Point II. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court disagrees
with Mr. Menzies' position in Point I, where a transcript is
prepared by an individual who is not certified in Utah to act as a
court reporter, at the very least, the State bears the burden of
establishing the accuracy of the transcript in order to use it to
review a capital homicide case.
Regardless of which party has the burden, the numerous
significant errors in the transcript prepared by the notereader or
Ms. Lee establish that neither version accurately reflects what
occurred in court.
Without an accurate, verbatim transcript, mandatory
review of this capital homicide case for plain error is impossible;
- 15 -

no further showing of harm is required.
Point III, Assuming, arguendo, that this Court requires
a showing of harm, both versions of the transcript are replete with
errors which are prejudicial.
Point IV.

Mandatory review is an essential component of

Utah's death penalty scheme.

The eighth and fourteenth amendments

are violated where an accurate, verbatim transcript with which to
review this case is not available.
Point V.

The lack of an accurate, verbatim transcript

with which to review this death penalty case violates Mr. Menzies'
right to appeal under the Utah Constitution.
Point VI. The use of either version would violate
Mr. Menzies7 rights to due process and equal protection under the
Utah Constitution.
Point VII. The use of either version of the transcript
would violate Mr. Menzies7 federal constitutional rights to due
process, equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel.
Point VIII.

The ex parte supplementation of the record

by the prosecutor violates various Utah constitutional and statutory
rights and federal constitutional rights.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT REPORTERS AND STENOGRAPHERS
ACT AND UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-206(2) PRECLUDE
THE USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT PREPARED IN THIS CASE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) (1953 as amended) and Rule
26(10), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for an automatic
review by this Court of judgment and sentence in cases where a death
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sentence is imposed.
Both the statute and rule require the certification of
the "entire record"; implicit in this requirement is the
contemplation that this Court must be provided with a verbatim,
true, accurate, and correct transcript of what occurred in the trial
court in order to provide for a meaningful review of the judgment
and sentence.

See generally Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Cr.

App. 1987); United States v. Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700, 702 (D.C. Cir.
1970) ("There can be little doubt that the absence of a complete and
accurate transcript impairs the ability of appellate counsel to
protect his client's basic rights . . . 'Frequently, issues simply
cannot even be seen—let alone assessed—without reading an accurate
transcript.,H).
The Court Reporters and Stenographers Act ("the Act"),
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-1.1 et seq. requires that official court
reporters who prepare transcripts for appeals be certified by the
Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.

Utah Code

Ann. § 78-56-15 (1953 as amended).18

18

In order to be certified to act as a court reporter
in Utah, an individual must make written application, include proof
of qualifications in that application, verify the application, and
pay appropriate fees. U.C.A. § 58-1-11. The individual must be a
citizen, at least eighteen years old, of "good moral character,"
possess "a high degree of skill and ability in the art of shorthand
reporting," and "pass a satisfactory examination as provided in this
chapter." U.C.A. § 78-56-16.
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
may issue a license without an examination where the person has been
licensed in another state which has education, experience and
examination requirements equal to those of Utah. U.C.A. § 58-1-12.
To be eligible for reciprocal licensing, the individual must produce
"satisfactory evidence of his identity and good standing in his
(continued)
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Tauni Lee, the court reporter assigned to Judge Uno's
courtroom during the trial of this case, never applied for nor
obtained a certificate to act as a court reporter in the State of
Utah.

R. 1166:9; D.E. 1, Affidavit of George Weiler, Addendum F.

The trial judge appropriately found that Ms. Lee had never been
certified in Utah.

R. 1186:5; R. 1725; R. 1936:14.19

Despite Ms. Lee's lack of certification, the trial judge
placed the burden on Mr. Menzies "to establish that the record is
not correct, and that if there are any errors, the errors cannot be
corrected with due diligence, and further, that such errors are
prejudicial even after correction."

R. 1186:5; R. 1725. 20

Although the Act does not explicitly outline the effect
of the lack of certification of a court reporter on the

(footnote 18 continued)
occupation or profession." Id. Furthermore, such reciprocal
licensing is not mandatory. See Call v. Billings, 140 P.2d 640
(Utah 1943) .
In the present case, Ms. Lee's California license had
lapsed and become delinquent when she was hired by Third District
Court, so she would have been unable to produce satisfactory
evidence of her good standing had she applied in Utah.
19

Although Ms. Lee had been licensed in the State of
California in 1985, that license lapsed and became delinquent in
April, 1987, ten months before the trial in the instant case began.
The effect of that delinquent license and Ms. Lee's R.P.R.
designation are discussed infra at 29-31.
20

The trial judge initially ruled that the burden of
establishing the accuracy and completeness of the transcript was on
both the State and the Defendant. R. 1936:15. The trial judge
stated, "[b]ecause as I indicated, in this situation here, I think
that the state would probably have the burden, because both of you
have brought forth all the arguments for and against." The judge
then pointed out how difficult it would be for the State to
establish the accuracy of the transcript, stating, "[t]he only way
the state can prove the accuracy of the transcript is to have both
(continued)
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acceptability for appellate purposes of any transcript prepared by
that reporter, it does make failure to comply with the Act, or use
of the designation "C.S.R." by someone who is not certified in Utah
a misdemeanor.21

The criminal sanctions against reporting without a

Utah license demonstrate the importance of these licensing
provisions.
Furthermore, Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires the parties to obtain a certified court reporter
to transcribe any recorded proceedings where a reporter was not
present.

Pursuant to Rule 11(e), a "person other than a certified

court transcriber" can be used to transcribe a hearing where no
reporter was present only "[b]y stipulation of the parties approved
by the appellate court."

Obviously, a stipulation to use a

noncertified court reporter does not exist in this case.

This rule,

when read in conjunction with the Act, suggests the expectation that
reporters will be certified, and further suggests that the appellate
court will not accept as an official transcript a transcript
prepared by a noncertified person unless the parties so stipulate.

(footnote 20 continued)
of you get together to find out what the errors and omissions are."
Id. The trial judge apparently never thought about, or at least did
not address, the difficulty of requiring Mr. Menzies to prove a
negative—that this transcript did not reflect what occurred in
court.
After Mr. Menzies filed his motion to reconsider and
clarify, the judge determined that the burden was on Mr. Menzies.
R. 1186:5; R. 1725.
21

Ms. Lee violated both § 78-56-15 and § 78-56-18 when
she acted as an official reporter without obtaining a Utah license,
and used the designation "C.S.R." when she "certified" each of the
volumes of transcript. See, e.g., 517, 1593, 2214.
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Although there is no Utah case directly discussing the
effect of lack of certification of a court reporter, cases from
other jurisdictions provide some guidance.
In In re David T., 127 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. 4th App.
1976), the court reversed a juvenile's criminal conviction where the
juvenile court used a shorthand reporter who was not a certified
court reporter to record oral proceedings.

The court pointed out

that:
the statute [requiring certification of court
reporters] prescribes the minimum
qualifications presumed to assure a prima facie
correct transcript. Less than these
qualifications supports a contrary presumption
which renders the certification of the accuracy
prescribed by statute meaningless.
Id. at 731.
In David T., the court also based its decision on the
fact that a statute explicitly provided that a juvenile could appeal
his conviction and be provided with a transcript to do so. By
comparison, in the present case, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2)
explicitly requires the mandatory review of judgment and sentence in
this case, and that the "entire record" of proceedings be certified
to the Supreme Court.
Arkansas requires that a transcript be prepared and
certified by a reporter licensed in that state in order to use the
transcript on appeal, unless the parties certify that the transcript
prepared by the unlicensed person is "true, accurate and complete.11
Pullan v. Fulbright, 685 S.W.2d 151 (Ark. 1985).
In Pullan, the court stated that transcripts which are
not prepared by a certified reporter "cannot be accepted by the
- 20 -

Supreme court."

Id. at 152. The court pointed out its intention to

strictly follow the rule requiring certification of court reporters,
but because the rule had recently been adopted, the court allowed an
exception where the parties stipulate that the transcripts are true,
accurate and correct.
Pursuant to the Act, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) and
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a transcript prepared
by an uncertified reporter cannot be used for the automatic review
of this death penalty case unless the parties stipulate to its use.
In the absence of such a stipulation, an official, certified
transcript does not exist and this Court is unable to perform its
mandatory review of this case, requiring reversal.

See Delap v.

State. 350 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1977); Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814
(Okl. 1988); Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987).
POINT II. MANDATORY REVIEW IS IMPOSSIBLE SINCE
AN ACCURATE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT EXIST.
A. THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING
THE ACCURACY OF THE TRANSCRIPT.
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court disagrees with
Mr. Menzies' assertion in Point I of this brief that the transcript
prepared in this case cannot be used since it was not prepared by a
certified court reporter, and the parties did not stipulate to using
a noncertified reporter, the State nevertheless has the burden of
establishing the accuracy of either version in order to use it on
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appeal.22
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6 provides:
A transcript of a reporter's notes, written in
longhand or typewritten, certified by him as
being a correct transcript of evidence and
proceedings, is a prima facie correct statement
of such evidence and proceedings.
The implication of this statute, when read together with
the rest of the Act, is that a transcript which is prepared by
someone who is not certified is not prima facie correct, and that a
party seeking to use such a transcript must, at the very least,
establish its accuracy.
In addition to the implications of § 78-56-6 and
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Utah case law,
although not directly on point, supports Mr. Menzies7 argument that
the State must establish the accuracy of this uncertified transcript
in order to use it to review this case.
In Flannery v. Flannery, 536 P.2d 136 (Utah 1975), a
civil divorce case, an apparently certified reporter had forgotten
to sign the certification of the transcript.

In this relatively

simple case, the court was able to look to the minute entry which
agreed in substance with the transcript and thereby
proof of the accuracy of the transcript."

fl

supplie[d] the

Id. at 138. This

language in Flannery supports Mr. Menzies7 position that the
presumption of correctness does not apply, and the party seeking to

22

The State presented very little evidence in the new
trial hearings, relying instead on Judge Uno7s erroneous ruling that
Mr. Menzies must establish the inaccuracy of the transcript. See
R. 1166, 1185, 1931.
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use the transcript must "supply the proof" of its accuracy.23
State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983), also
supports Mr. Menzies' argument that the State must establish the
accuracy of the transcript.

In Taylor, this Court stated that it

was "not at liberty to assume" what missing voir dire answers were.
Even though the trial court had left the juror on the panel and the
lower court had affirmed the decision in denying defendant's motion
for new trial, this Court reversed the conviction and granted
defendant a new trial.
The trial court's conclusion that Mr. Menzies had the
burden of establishing the inaccuracy of the transcript was
incorrect.
B. NEITHER THE "ORIGINAL" VERSION NOR THE
"CALIFORNIA" VERSION IS AN ACCURATE, RELIABLE,
VERBATIM REFLECTION OF WHAT OCCURRED IN THE
TRIAL COURT.
Although Mr. Menzies continues to maintain that the State
has the burden, the evidence of inaccuracy of either version of the
transcript is so overwhelming that the transcript is not useable,
regardless of who has the burden.
1. Ms. Lee Did Not Record All of the
Proceedings.
Ms. Lee stopped recording voir dire questions, and

23

Because of the numerosity and complexity of the
issues in this case, the length of the trial, and the need for a
mandatory review for plain error, resorting to minute entries does
not resolve the transcript problems in this case. Furthermore, the
minute entries in this case are themselves unreliable. Counsel for
Mr. Menzies has been unable to locate a minute entry for at least
one hearing—the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress which was
held on November 7, 1986.

-

?-\

-

instead, the notereader inserted questions that had been asked of
previous jurors. R. 1931:30-33, 35; T. 51-2. Ms. Lee's failure to
record all of the questions was discovered because the trial judge
had misstated one of the questions asked of an initial juror, and
that misstatement is repeated throughout the voir dire.

R. 1931:33;

see 338, 371, 379, 404, 425, 452, 498, 508, 529, 541, 562, 572, 602,
634, 645, 657, 677, 689, 701, 721, 731, 734, 739, 747, 760, 770,
781, 809, 820, 836, 846, 866, 882. This apparently happened for
more than one question.

T. 618; R. 1931:37.

In addition, questions and juror responses do not make
sense, suggesting that Ms. Lee did not take down the questions as
asked, instead inserting them from earlier questions.

T. 55, 103,

117, 128, 215, 530, 543, 711, 753, 859-86.
Furthermore, Ms. Lee did not take down admonitions to the
jury during voir dire.

Instead, she placed an asterisk in her

notes, and the notereader made up a statement which she attributed
to the judge.

See, e.g., T. 557, 584, 594, 624, 638, 663, 681, 694,

725, 741, 751, 765, 766, 774, 787, 815, 831, 853. Ms. Lee also
failed to take down admonitions throughout the trial.

R. 1931:31-2.

2. The Original Version is Not "Sufficiently
Accurate."
a. A notereader and proofreader prepared the
original version.
A notereader prepared the original version from Ms. Lee's
shorthand notes.

R. 1166:108, 174. 24

After the notereader prepared

24 M S . Lee obtained the name of the notereader from
another shorthand reporter. R. 1166:174. The notereader was not a
(continued)
O A

the transcript, the notereader gave it to a third person
("proofreader") who read the transcript for errors. R. 1166:108,
174. 25
The use of notereaders is not favored by qualified
shorthand reporters because "[t]here is too much room for
misinterpretation."

R. 1185:11, 12, 36, 43. A reporter would have

to take "extremely accurate notes that somebody could read almost
without a flaw" in order to effectively use a notereader.
R. 1185:43. The reporter would then have to read each page word for
word before certifying the transcript.
few court reporters use notereaders.

R. 1185:11, 12, 43. Very

R. 1185:4l.26

(footnote 24 continued)
certified shorthand reporter, and Ms. Lee did not do a background
check on her, nor did she check to make sure the notereader could
read her notes. R. 1166:174.
25

Ms. Lee did not know who the proofreader was or
whether she had any qualifications; Ms. Lee did not do a background
check on the proofreader, nor did she have any direct dealings with
her. R. 1166:175. Ms. Lee did proofread the first volume.
R. 1166:177. After that, the notereader decided that it would be
faster to have someone else proof the remaining volumes, so the
notereader retained the proofreader and Ms. Lee stopped reading the
volumes. R. 1166:176. The notereader was working at another job
while she prepared these transcripts. R. 1166:184. After the
proofreader read the transcripts, she gave them back to the
notereader, who in turn, gave them to Ms. Lee. R. 1166:175. The
notereader marked the transcripts with paperclips where she had
questions. R. 1166:175. Ms. Lee then read the paperclipped
portions and gave the transcript back to the notereader for
corrections. Ms. Lee did not check the transcripts again to make
sure that the changes had been made. R. 1166:207. Nor did she read
the entire volume before certifying that the transcript was a true
and correct reflection of what occurred in court. R. 1166:175, 177,
205, 208. To date, Ms. Lee has read only the first volume of
transcript "prepared" by her in this case.
26 Carlton Way, a Third District Court reporter, uses a
notereader and gave the name of his notereader to Ms. Lee.
(continued)
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A comparison of the transcript prepared by certified
reporter Carlton Way with that prepared by the notereader27
indicates that the notereader in the present case took significant
liberties in transcribing the notes.

See Addendum N containing

T. 888-93 and the official transcript certified by Carlton Way and
prepared from the same notes as T. 888-93.28

(footnote 26 continued)
R. 1185:84. He used the notereader "sparingly" for approximately a
thousand pages per year. R. 1185:85, 89. He gave her overflow work
only; the only felony jury trial he had her prepare was a transcript
for a case in Idaho where the transcript was to be used on retrial
after a hung jury. R. 1185:91. He never had the notereader prepare
a felony jury trial transcript which was to be used for appellate
purposes; the only appeal transcript she prepared for him was from a
civil bench trial. R. 1185:90, 91. Mr. Way testified that he read
the entire transcript which was prepared by the notereader and that
it was his responsibility to make sure that it was accurate before
certifying it. R. 1185:93-4.
Although Mr. Way testified that the notereader's work was
generally "excellent," he had used her only for a total of
approximately two thousand pages over the course of two to three
years. Both the trial court and this Court are able to compare a
short section of her work against an official transcript prepared by
a certified court reporter, and determine whether the notereader7s
work in fact appears to be excellent. T. 888-93. See Addendum N.
27

In the present case, the notereader accidentally
prepared a short section of notes which had been taken by Mr. Way
when Ms. Lee failed to attend a portion of a hearing. T. 888.
Apparently, the notes were erroneously given to the notereader along
with Ms. Lee's notes, and the notereader included them in the
original version. Ms. Lee certified the transcript prepared from
these notes in the original version even though she had not been
present when they were taken. T. 888-94.
28

In five and one-half pages of transcript, there were
27 discrepancies in words, phrases or names of speakers between the
notereader7s version of what was in the notes and that which was
transcribed by Mr. Way. The notereader indicated that different
people were speaking than Mr. Way, confusing Ernie Jones for Rick
MacDougal, defense counsel for the prosecutor, and defense counsel
for the judge, among others; at one point, the notereader indicated
only one speaker where Ms. Wells actually interrupted Ms. Palacios,
according to Mr. Way. T. 889-91. The notereader also selected
(continued)
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The notereader was not present during the trial and
relied completely on Ms. Lee's notes in preparing the transcript.
Hence, the unreliability of Ms. Lee's notes further demonstrates the
unreliability of the original version.

Portions of the original

version which make more sense than the California version do so only
because the notereader guessed as to what may have been said.
The manner in which the original version was prepared
demonstrates the unreliability of that transcript, and that is not
"sufficiently accurate" for review of this case.
b. The original version contains voir dire
answers, argument, testimony, and statements by
the court which the notereader made up.
Portions of the original transcript do not appear in
Ms. Lee's notes. The notereader apparently created portions of the
transcript.
(1) Voir dire answers, questions, admonitions, or
discussions which were apparently made up by the notereader can be

(footnote 28 continued)
words other than those which were in the notes. For example, she
selected "a substitute" instead of the word "astute" and "raise your
hand" instead of record. T. 888, 891. She also left out words,
such as "able," "any," and "between 9:00 and." T. 888, 892, 890.
In addition, she included phrases which were different from those
transcribed by Mr. Way, such as "Or can we start" instead of "We can
start," defense counsel saying "as well as that—the jurors you have
selected" instead of the court saying "Is that the jurors as you
have selected them?," and "has created problems with us exercising
to have a fair and impartial jury" instead of "has created problems
with us being—exercising and having a fair and impartial jury."
T. 890, 892. Finally, she inserted activity which was not in the
notes and left out words which were included in the notes. T. 890,
891. Although an official version prepared by certified court
reporter Carlton Way exists in regard to these five and one-half
pages, the discrepancies in the notereader7s version are
nevertheless significant in that they demonstrate the unreliable
manner in which the original version was prepared.
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found at the following transcript pages:

52, 130, 461, 557, 594,

624, 638, 663, 681, 688, 694, 709, 734, 740, 751, 766, 774, 787,
815, 876; R. 1932:30-1.
The original version shows the trial judge asking a
rehabilitating question of a juror, whereas Ms. Lee's notes do not
include such question and, in fact, include a question that makes no
sense but is significantly different from the notereader's version.
T. 687-8.

The original version left out answers and questions and

attributed statements, answers and questions (T. 588, 699, 740, 821,
858), to various speakers which did not appear in Ms. Lee's notes.
T. 707, 740, 804.

Questions and juror responses do not make sense.

T. 55, 103, 117, 128, 215, 530, 543, 711, 753, 859-86.
(2)

Ms. Lee supplied the notereader with copies of

police reports, the trial judge's notes, and the autopsy reports
which she had possession of unbeknownst to the defense.
R. 1931:73-75.

When the shorthand notes were opened for review by

Ms. Lee in California, the police reports were still wrapped around
the notes.

R. 1931:74.

The notereader supplemented Ms. Lee's notes

with information from those reports or notes.

See, e.g., 2238,

2266, 3261; R. 1931:73.
(3)

Other examples of portions of the transcript which

the notereader made up can be found at the following pages:

52,

130, 234, 251, 461, 557, 584, 594, 624, 638, 663, 681, 688, 694,
706, 709, 734, 740, 751, 766, 774, 787, 815, 876, 1605, 1606, 1611,
1614, 1628, 1643, 1653, 1674, 1731, 1741, 1775, 1810, 1845, 1849,
1854, 1857, 2196, 2201, 2207, 2299, 2307, 2399, 3035, 3055.
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3. Ms. Lee's Notes and the "California"
Version Are Unreliable.
The State agreed that the notereader7s creations often
made more sense than Ms. Lee's notes, even though the notereader was
not present during the proceedings.

R. 1932:27, 30, 45, 46, 47, 55,

58, 66.
A review of the California version establishes that
significant portions are unintelligible; that Ms. Lee had difficulty
accurately recording numbers, names, words, and phrases; and that
Ms. Lee failed to take verbatim notes. R. 1931:28-9, 31-2. See
discussion infra at 32-36.
4. Ms. Lee Was Not Qualified to Report This
Case.
The State argued that Ms. Lee would have automatically
been licensed had she applied in Utah, and Judge Uno determined that
Ms. Lee was "de facto" licensed and qualified to report this trial
(R. 1186:5; R. 1725).

Even if Ms. Lee were qualified and would have

been licensed, she did not obtain a license and the presumption of
§ 78-56-6 is not therefore applicable.

The issue of whether she

would have been licensed is relevant only to the issue of whether
Ms. Lee had the background and experience necessary to act as a
court reporter in this case, and not to the issue of whether the
transcripts are certified.
A review of the Act demonstrates that Ms. Lee would not
have been automatically licensed had she applied in Utah.

Her

California license was delinquent, and she therefore could not
demonstrate good standing in California or use that license as a
basis for obtaining a Utah license without taking the Utah
- 29 -

examination.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16. Relying on her nontested

RPR designation, which she obtained based on her delinquent
California license, to obtain a Utah license would have violated
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16.29
Furthermore, in order to be licensed as a court reporter,
a person must be of good moral character.

The State of Utah never

took the opportunity to investigate the moral character of Ms. Lee
prior to hiring her.

Evidence exists in this case demonstrating

that Ms. Lee does not have the character for honesty required of
court reporters.

Her testimony during the hearings contains

numerous false statements.

R. 1166:169-70; R. 1185:20-1. According

to Ron Gibson, Ms. Lee claimed that she needed to work at home on
the Menzies transcripts to utilize her computer (see Addendum K;
R. 1166:77); Ms. Lee later denied under oath that she had used her
computer on the Menzies transcripts or made such a statement to Ron
Gibson.
court.

R. 1166:178.

She breached the security of the district

R. 1166:79; see Addenda K and L.

She had sanctions imposed

against her in California for failure to file timely transcripts.
See Addendum G.30

29

Although the State claimed that court reporters were
licensed based on a nontested RPR designation at the time Ms. Lee
was hired, the statute specifically requires an examination and good
standing. U.C.A. § 78-56-16. No rules deviating from the statutory
examination requirement existed at that time. If the court
reporters were being licensed based on a nontested RPR designation,
such licensure violated Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16. A nontested RPR
designation cannot now be used as a basis for obtaining a Utah
license.
30

Allegations of fraud and official misconduct were
included in the Accusation filed in California prior to revocation
of Ms. Lee's California license. See Addendum I.
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In addition, Ms. Lee knew very little about the role of
the court reporter.

She claimed that did not know that she had to

be licensed to act as an official reporter in Utah.

R. 1166:114.

She included an ex parte statement from the prosecutor after the
trial was over, then testified that anything having to do with
Mr. Menzies was legitimately part of the record in this case and
that she, not Judge Uno, was the person responsible for deciding
what to include.

T. 3273-6; R. 1166:160-1. She certified

transcripts using an expired and delinquent license number when she
had not read the transcripts and therefore was not in a position to
so certify.

R. 1166:123-4, 205. She stopped taking notes during

portions of voir dire and simply repeated questions the judge had
asked of an earlier juror, even though the judge did not instruct
her to stop taking notes. R. 1931:31-2. She failed or refused to
attend hearings when Judge Uno's court was in session.

See Addenda

K and L.
Furthermore, the quality of Ms. Lee's work was bad.
R. 1185:15-17, 45-9. She was fired or let go from the two court
reporting firms where she attempted to work immediately prior to and
after she reported this trial. R. 1185:18, 48. She had difficulty
taking accurate notes and then reading those notes once she had
taken them.

R. 1185:17. She omitted words, the transcripts she

prepared contained "total inconsistent errors throughout," and
customers complained about her work.

R. 1185:16-17, 47. Both

reporters testified that she was not capable of reporting a capital
homicide case.

R. 1185:15-17, 20-1, 46-50, 53.

Ms. Lee testified that she had worked as a court reporter
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for "the whole time" since she had been licensed in California in
April, 1985 and that "over the last four and a half, almost five
years, everything I've done in court has been some type of a jury."
R. 1166:102. Her own testimony as well as other evidence introduced
at the hearings established that this testimony was not true. 31
The overwhelming evidence as to Ms. Lee's lack of ability
to transcribe this case supports Mr. Menzies' argument that the
transcripts in this case are wholly unreliable.
5. Apparent Errors Demonstrate That Neither
Version is Sufficiently Accurate.

31

Ms. Lee's later testimony and that of Linda
Van Tassell established that Ms. Lee had not worked as a court
reporter "the whole time" since she had been licensed and had, in
fact, worked as a secretary for a short period of time (R. 1166:106)
and had been unemployed for significant periods of time, including
the period from April, 1987 when her California license became
delinquent until July, 1987 when she got a part-time temporary job
as a secretary at BYU for two weeks (R. 1166:106, 122, 128) and from
approximately October 15, 1987 until she obtained the position in
Third District Court on January 14, 1988 (R. 1185:15; see also
resume of Tauni Lee contained in personnel file, D.E. 4). Nor was
almost everything Ms. Lee did a jury trial. Most of her experience
was in California municipal court, which is similar to Utah's
circuit court in that it hears traffic matters, small civil cases,
and misdemeanors. R. 1166:102, 119. During her less than two years
as a court reporter in California, she reported only eight cases in
which appellate transcripts were requested. At least four of those
were civil cases in which Orders to Show Cause for failure to file
the transcript in a timely fashion were eventually filed against
her. See Addenda G and H. In at least one of those cases, the
transcript was "sent out for corrections." In addition, Ms. Lee was
at some point jailed for her failure to follow a court order that
she prepare transcripts. R. 1189 (September 24, 1990):12.
Ms. Lee also testified that as part of the California
examination, she had been tested for five minutes at 2 00 words per
minute and had been told that she obtained a 97 percent accuracy
score. R. 1166:99. Even if Ms. Lee's testimony were to be
believed, she had taken the test almost three years before she was
hired by Third District Court and had been unlicensed for nine
months at the time she was hired.
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a. Portions of the transcript are
unintelligible.
(1)

Numerous portions relating to the "Britton" issue

are unintelligible.

T. 961, 962, 963, 964, 966, 967, 1077, 1088,

1090, 1091, 1092, 1107, 1110, 1114, 1115, 1117, 1121, 1122, 1124,
1822, 1828, 1829, 1849, 1851, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1857, 1859, 1860,
1867, 1868, 1869, 2007, 2011, 2019, 2027, 2029, 2031, 2039, 2053,
2054, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2068-9.

The erroneous admission of

Britton7s preliminary hearing testimony is an appellate issue in
this case.
(2)

Defense counsel argued that Mr. Menzies' entire

prison record should not be admitted during the penalty phase.
R. 2839-40, 42-4.

Portions of that argument and the bases for the

trial court admitting the record are unintelligible.
2885-87.

R. 2839-44,

The erroneous admission of this record spawned several

appellate issues.
(3)

Mr. Menzies challenged several jurors for cause.

Ms. Lee's version of the questions and answers of those jurors does
not reflect what was stated or are unintelligible.
357, 350-60, 543, 545, 548-9, 741, 747.
T. 284-5, 741, 757, 760.

T. 272-80, 289,

She confused speakers.

In argument, counsel refers to questions

and answers which are not in the transcript.

T. 358-60.

The

notereader made up voir dire answers for some of the jurors.
T. 751-2.

Issues regarding Mr. Menzies7 challenges for cause are

being raised on appeal.

The importance of reviewing voir dire and

the granting or denial of challenges for cause in capital cases is
well established and often requires reversal.
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(4)

Other unintelligible portions of the transcript

occur at 914, 988, 1469 (defense objection omitted), 1857, 1615,
1626, 1790, 2066, 2068 (court ruling); 2019, 1942 (ruling on
mistrial motion and factual findings); 1952, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2011,
2013-4, 2137, 2139, 2166, 2175, 2176, 2179, 2183, 2239, 2240, 2243,
2246, 2363, 2364, 2372, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2394, 2398, 2402, 2405,
2422-3, 2439.
b. The State agreed and the trial court found
that portions of the transcript were
unintelligible.
The State stipulated and the Court found that portions of
the 29 pages of transcript reviewed during the "reconstruction
hearing" on December 19, 1990 were incomprehensible or inaccurately
taken down, and that the version created by the notereader often
made more sense than that which had been taken down by Ms. Lee, even
though the notereader worked exclusively from Ms. Lee's notes.
R. 1932:27, 30, 45-46, 47, 55, 58, 62, 66.
c.

Ms. Lee was unable to read her notes.

During the proceedings in California, Ms. Lee indicated
on numerous occasions that she could not read her notes; a review of
the context also demonstrates her inability to read her notes.
Examples of portions of proceedings where Ms. Lee was
unable to read her notes can be found on the following transcript
pages:

7, 14, 50, 74, 1611, 1612, 1668, 1783, 1829, 1870, 1939,

2497, 2624, 2637, 2653, 2654, 2970, 2972, 2982, 2985, 3003, 3058,
3079, 3085, 3172, 3173, 3178.
d. Numbers contained in either version of the
transcript are wholly unreliable.
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A comparison of the "original" transcripts with Ms. Lee's
"California" version demonstrates that Ms. Lee was incapable of
accurately taking down numbers, and raises the concern that any
number throughout the transcripts, even where the notereader and
Ms. Lee read the same number, is wholly unreliable due to Ms. Lee's
deficiencies in taking down numbers.
Mr. Menzies has identified number discrepancies in the
following pages:

T. 8, 14, 15, 30, 32, 34, 36, 41, 271, 385, 887,

1478, 1507, 1513, 1514, 1515, 1604, 1612, 1678, 1703, 1734, 1742,
1745, 1786, 1875, 1877, 1881, 1888, 1889, 1920, 1927, 2006, 2007,
2028, 2039, 2053, 2055, 2251, 3656, 2651, 2264, 2318, 2620, 2652,
2665, 2704, 2860, 2923, 2960, 3035, 3094, 3202, 3237, 3257, 3259.
e. Ms. Lee did not accurately hear and take
down what was said in court. 32
Ms. Lee had repeated difficulty with names.

T. 18, 41,

51, 53, 55, 68, 114, 117, 159, 189, 192, 201, 207, 284-5, 741.

In

addition, throughout the transcript, errors can be found which
indicate that Ms. Lee misheard and/or incorrectly noted what was
said.

T. 150 ("Bankridge" instead of "Panguitch"); 1628, 1710,

1823, 1845, 2040 ("cave" instead of "archive"); 1659, 1665, 1707,
1713, 2001 ("functional" instead of "fungible"); 2972 ("sure now"
instead of "thorough"); 3055 ("usual" instead of "unusual"); 3061
("four shock block test" instead of "Rorschach test"); 323 0
("appropriate" instead of "inappropriate").

32

During the new trial proceedings on at least one
occasion, the prosecutor acknowledged that a miscommunication had
occurred between what was said in court and Ms. Lee's ear.
R. 1188:53-4.
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f. The transcript indicates an incorrect
speaker.
In portions of the transcript, it is difficult to
ascertain who, in fact, is speaking.

T. 1243, 1622, 1775, 1853,

1859, 2031, 2032, 2076, 2509, 2584.
g. Ms. Lee failed to take down what occurred
in court.
Ms. Lee used asterisks in her notes to denote a number of
things including bench conferences, swearing in, taking an oath,
admitting an exhibit, admonitions by the judge, etc.

R. 1931:3 0-3.

Not all occurrences are reflected in the transcript.

See, e.g.,

281, 289, 1613, 1633, 1634, 1637, 1673, 1676, 1678, 1679, 1680,
1681, 1716, 1717, 1730, 1774, 1775, 1809, 1816, 1869, 1878, 1880,
2365, 2402, 2407, 2430, 2450, 2452, 2607.
h. Items appear to be missing from portions of
the transcript.
In many places, topics of discussion change abruptly,
answers do not follow from the questions before them, or the
transcript does not make sense.
occurred when the juror fainted.

The most glaring example of this
T. 1622. 3 3

C. THE LACK OF A VERBATIM ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT
WITH WHICH TO REVIEW THIS CASE VIOLATES UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-3-206, REQUIRING REVERSAL ABSENT
A SHOWING OF HARM.

33

Although the participants remember the bailiff
running across the room and possibly saying something along with
several other events, the transcript reflects only that the judge
took a recess. T. 1622. Nothing further is on the record until
much later when other events involving the jurors occur. However, a
nonsequitur appears several pages later when the judge says, "Rick
may be much more subtle or sophisticated." T. 1624.
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As previously outlined, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2)
requires that the trial court certify the "entire record" to this
Court so that this court can conduct its mandatory review.

Implicit

in § 76-3-206(2) is a requirement that an accurate, complete,
verbatim transcript of proceedings be included in the record.

See

Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d at 213, 214 n. 5 (defendant in capital
case entitled to "verbatim transcription"; court cannot begin review
until trial court certifies "entire record").
The Dunn court emphasized that a capital defendant need
not show harm in order to obtain a new trial where the "entire
record" is not certified to the appellate court.

The court stated:

Moreover, because this is a death penalty case,
"[wje may not shirk our duty to review 'the
entire record7 [citation omitted] on the
grounds that the appellant has not shown 'harm7
in being denied portions of a transcription of
notes taken by the court reporter during the
course of the trial of a capital case. That
this Court have before it the entire record in
a capital case serves a public policy which
considers assuring even handed imposition of
the ultimate penalty as important, if not more
so, than faulting the one condemned for
inability to demonstrate on appeal how an error
resulted in disadvantage." McGee v. State, 711
S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. Cr. App. 1986)
(Clinton, J., concurring).
Dunn, 733 S.W.2d at 216.

See also Little v. State, 97 S.W.2d 479,

480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936).
Other courts require a complete and accurate transcript
of proceedings in the trial court in order to effectuate a mandatory
review of a death sentence.

See Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814

(Okl. Cr. 1988); Kelly v. State, 692 P.2d 563, 565 (Okl. Cr. 1984)
(Brett, J., concurring); Delap v. State, 350 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1977).
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Where such a complete and accurate transcript does not exist,
reversal is required regardless of whether the defendant can show
harm.
Although these cases, for the most part, deal with
situations where a transcript of a portion of proceedings is
missing, the rationale that no showing of harm is necessary is
nevertheless applicable where an inaccurate and uncertified
transcript is all that is available for the mandatory review of a
capital homicide conviction and death sentence.

The significant

inaccuracies in this transcript are analogous to missing portions;
furthermore, portions of the record are missing in this case since
Ms. Lee failed to take notes during portions of voir dire and failed
to record other portions of the proceedings.

See discussion supra

at 23-4; 27-9.
The lack of a verbatim, accurate and complete transcript
of proceedings in this case makes mandatory review under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-206(2) and requires reversal absent a showing of
specific harm as it relates to issues being raised on appeal.
POINT III. IN ADDITION TO THE INABILITY TO
REVIEW THIS TRANSCRIPT FOR PLAIN ERROR.
MR. MENZIES WOULD SUFFER PREJUDICE FROM THE USE
OF EITHER VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT.
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court requires a showing of
specific harm from the use of either version of this transcript,
Mr. Menzies outlines the following areas of prejudice:
1.

Voir Dire: Ms. Lee failed to take down all

questions; the notereader created questions and answers.
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See

discussion supra at 27-9. See State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447.
2.

Numbers: The unreliability of any number in this

transcript prejudices Mr. Menzies in the following ways:
a.
arguing?

What rule of evidence were the parties

T. 15.

In the reconstruction hearing, the

parties agreed and Judge Uno found that Rule "45" was an
incorrect transcription.

R. 1932:47-53. Nevertheless,

Judge Uno ordered that Rule 45 remain in the transcript
because after reviewing the Rules of Evidence and
rereading the transcript, the parties could not figure
out which rule was being argued.

R. 1932:47-53. The

argument found at T. 15 relates directly to the "Britton"
issue on appeal; as the transcript now stands, it is
impossible to tell what was being argued.
b.

When did Nicole Arnold and her new husband

deliver the Social Security card?

An appellate issue in

this case is Mr. Menzies7 argument that the trial judge
erroneously admitted a Social Security card bearing the
name of Maureen Hunsaker.

Defense counsel attempted to

preclude the admission of the card by highlighting a
discrepancy in dates. T. 1514, 2263-5. The "California"
and "original" versions transpose the dates, and there is
no way to ascertain the actual date to which Janet Franks
testified.
c.

T. 1514-5.
Dates relating to Britton's federal

sentencing and Rule 35 motion are unclear from the
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transcript and relate directly to his motive for
testifying at the preliminary hearing.

T. 2011, 2038,

2039,
d.

When did Officer Valdez find Maureen

Hunsaker's identification cards in the jail?
before Mr. Menzies was booked?

Was it

The two versions offer

different dates which are four days apart; the
discrepancy impacts on whether the cards can be linked to
Mr. Menzies.

T. 1604, 1600-4.

This example is also

significant in that it demonstrates the liberties taken
by the notereader in attempting to "fix" the transcript.
R. 1931:38.
e.

How far was Tim Larabee from the two people

he viewed at Storm Mountain?

T. 1198. On what date did

Detective Judd prepare the composite?

T. 1703.

In both

instances, the notereader's version differs significantly
from that of Ms. Lee; both impact on Tilths ability to
identify the male he saw at Storm Mountain.
f.
Menzies?

What day did Officer Thompson talk to Ralph

T. 1875. Where did Ralph tell Officer Thompson

he picked up the young woman hitchhiker?
Where did they get stuck in the mud?

T. 1876, 1881.

T. 1877. What was

the stipulation between the parties as to when the
booking process ended?

T. 1888, 1889 (a shorter booking

process would demonstrate that Mr. Menzies did not have
time to secrete the identification cards later found in
jail laundry).

How much money was missing from the
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Gas-A-Mat, and how much was found in the umbrella?
T. 2620.
In the penalty phase, was Dr. Winkleman's
testimony based on study of 100 clients or 1 client?
T. 2960.

In what I.Q. percentile does Mr. Menzies

function—5th, 55th 80th, or 85th?
3.

T. 3035, 3036.

Numerous Portions of the Arguments Regarding the

Admission of Britton's Preliminary Hearing Testimony Are
Unintelligible.

T. 961, 962, 963, 964, 966, 967, 1077, 1088, 1090,

1091, 1092, 1107, 1110, 1114, 1115, 1117, 1121, 1122, 1124, 1822,
1828, 1829, 1849, 1851, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1857, 1859, 1860, 1867,
1868, 1869, 2007, 2011, 2019, 2027, 2029, 2031, 2039, 2053, 2054,
2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2068-9.
4.

Ms. Lee's Inability to Read Her Notes Prejudiced

Mr. Menzies.
What were voir dire answers?

E.g., T. 50, 52, 151-2.

Did the question asked by Judge Uno rehabilitate the juror?
What did the witness answer?

T. 1668, 2970, 2972.

Mr. Menzies did not have in the last two years?

T. 74.

What was it

T. 3003. 3 4

What

was the second diagnosis of Mr. Menzies that neither the notereader
nor Ms. Lee could read?

T. 3079.

Is it important to mitigation?

Would it affect a reviewing court's impression of the penalty phase
evidence?

Is important mitigation evidence not included in an

accurate manner?

T. 3085, 3172, 3173, 3178.

34

The lack of a dismissal is not mitigation; however,
the lack of a "disciplinary" would be mitigating evidence. T. 3003.
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5.
R. 802-3.

Witnesses May Not Have Been Sworn.

T. 926,

The names of the three witnesses which Ms. Lee indicated

were sworn when the exclusionary rule was invoked are not included
in the transcript.

T. 926; see also R. 802-3.

Ms. Lee did not

record the swearing of witnesses; instead, she inserted asterisks.
Additional prejudice relating to issues on appeal exists;
due to page limitations, Mr. Menzies outlines only those errors set
forth above.
POINT IV. THE LACK OF A VERBATIM ACCURATE
TRANSCRIPT VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, protects
against cruel and unusual punishment.

In order to comply with the

eighth and fourteenth amendments, the death penalty cannot be
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner, and a capital
sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons upon
whom the death penalty can be imposed and provide a meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which the penalty is imposed.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2763, 33
L.Ed.2d 46 (1972); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950,
2958, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah
1972), cert, denied 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 406 (1980).
Decisions of this Court indicate that meaningful
appellate review is a necessary component of Utah's death penalty
scheme to insure that the penalty is imposed so as not to violate
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the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d

546, 552-3 (Utah 1987), this Court reiterated "the established rule
[for mandatory review] in death penalty cases" and emphasized that
the rule, as outlined, "best supports the past practices of this
Court, as well as our continuing responsibility to insure that the
sentence of death meets the concerns of Furman v. Georgia."
553.

Id. at

See also State v. Holland, 777 P.2d at 1022 ("[e]xecution of a

criminal defendant may not occur . . . until this Court determines
at least that the sentence is in accord with lawful process").
In Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d at 214, n.5, the court
pointed out that "mandatory review of the entire record in a capital
case" is not a mere formality.

Rather, it is an essential component

of the procedure chosen by the legislature "to ensure that ,this
unique penalty [is not] wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed'
[citation omitted]."
Various United States Supreme Court opinions also suggest
that meaningful appellate review of a death sentence is essential to
meet the requirements of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

In

his concurrence in Pulley v. Harris. 465 U.S. 37, 54, 104 S.Ct. 871,
79 L.Ed.2d 29, 43 (1984), Justice Stevens emphasized the importance
of meaningful appellate review.
. . . I believe that appellate review plays an
essential role in eliminating the systematic
arbitrariness and capriciousness which infected
death penalty schemes invalidated by Furman v.
Georgia [citation omitted], and hence that some
form of meaningful appellate review is
constitutionally required.
See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49
L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) ("As an important additional safeguard against
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arbitrariness and caprice, the Georgia statutory scheme provides for
automatic appeal of all death sentences to the State Supreme
Court.11); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77
L.Ed.2d 235, 248 (1983) ("Georgia's scheme includes two important
features . . .

a bifurcated procedure [citation omitted] and its

statute also mandates meaningful appellate review of every death
sentence [citation omitted]"); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 276

("By

providing prompt judicial review of the jury's decision in a court
of statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the
evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences
under law."); Parker v. Dugger,
L.Ed.2d

U.S.

, 111 S.Ct. 731,

(January 22, 1991) (capital homicide case remanded

based on arbitrary affirmance of death sentence).
Without a complete and accurate transcript, meaningful
appellate review is impossible.
(Wis. 1987).

See State v. Perry, 401 N.W.2d 748

As Justice Goldberg stated in his concurring opinion

in Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 227, 84 S.Ct. 2124, 11 L.Ed.2d
331 (1964):
[T]he most basic and fundamental tool [of an
appellate attorney's] profession is the
complete trial transcript, through which his
fingers may leaf and his trained eyes may roam
in search of an error, a lead to an error, or
even a basis upon which to urge a change in an
established and hitherto accepted principle of
law.
375 U.S. at 288, 84 S.Ct. at 431.
Because meaningful appellate review is an "essential
component" of Utah's death penalty scheme, the eighth and fourteenth
amendments would be violated by the use of the transcripts in this
case for mandatory review.
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POINT V. LACK OF AN ACCURATE VERBATIM
TRANSCRIPT VIOLATES MR, MENZIES' RIGHT TO
APPEAL UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION,
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution explicitly
guarantees, inter alia, that a criminal defendant has the "right to
appeal in all cases." See also Article VIII, § 5 .

In State v.

Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985), this Court recognized that this
provision demonstrates that "the drafters of our constitution
considered the right to appeal essential to a fair criminal
proceeding."

Id. at 740. This Court emphasized that "[r]ights

guaranteed by our state constitution are to be carefully protected"
and will not be "lightly forfeited,"35 and focused on "the
fundamental nature of the right to appellate review" under the state
constitution.

Id.36

A number of older decisions from various states have held
that the defendant's right to appeal has been violated, requiring

35

The federal constitution does not explicitly provide
for a right to appeal criminal convictions; instead, the right to
appeal is part of a defendant's federal due process rights where
state statutory or constitutional law provides.
36

Various statutes facilitate this fundamental right to
appellate review. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1982) (codifying
right to appeal); Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (Supp. 1989) (providing
court appointed counsel to indigent defendants through "the taking
of the first appeal"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-5 (Supp. 1989)
(requiring prosecuting agency to pay costs of preparing transcripts
on appeal for indigent defendants); Court Reporters and
Stenographers Act, § 78-56-1.1 et seq. (1987).
Although in noncapital contexts, this Court has held that
failure to transcribe the closing arguments of a criminal trial does
not require a new trial (State v. Glenny. 656 P.2d 990 (Utah 1982);
State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979)), it has also held that
inaudible responses during the voir dire of the jury panel required
a new trial. State v. Taylor. 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). The impact
of Article I, § 12 was not explicitly discussed in any of these
cases.
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reversal of the conviction, where the court reporter has not
prepared an adequate transcript.

See, e.g., Little v. State, 97

S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936); Brannan v. State, 132 S.W.2d 594
(Tex. Crim. App. 1939); Seliaer v. State, 138 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1940); People v. Lomoso, 134 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div.
1954); Gibbs v. State, 214 P. 745 (Okl. Crim. App. 1928); People v.
DeWilkowska, 285 N.Y.S. 430 (App. Div. 1936).

Although most of

these cases are not clear as to whether the decision is based on
state statutory or constitutional grounds, or federal grounds, they
affirm the principle that where a criminal defendant, through no
fault of his own, is denied an adequate transcript of the
proceedings, the conviction must be reversed due to the inability of
the appellate court to review the proceedings.
In addition, state courts have reversed criminal
convictions based on a state constitutional analysis where portions
of a transcript are missing.

See State v. Ford, 338 So.2d 107 (La.

1976); State v. Jones, 351 So.2d 1194 (La. 1977).
Other provisions in the Utah Constitution, when read in
conjunction with Article I, § 12, suggest that the Utah Constitution
requires that an accurate, verbatim transcript of proceedings be
certified to this Court for appellate review in death penalty cases.
Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution provides that a
right to a jury in a capital case remains inviolate.

Without an

accurate transcription of proceedings, the appellate court cannot
ascertain whether that right was violated.
Furthermore, Article I, § 9 protects against cruel and
unusual punishment.

This Court has acknowledged that the broader
- 46 -

language of Article I, § 9 than the eighth amendment could provide
greater protection to criminal defendants in Utah.

See State v.

Bishop. 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986).
Without a transcript which accurately reflects what
occurred in court, Mr. Menzies' right to appeal and the protections
of Article I, sections 9 and 10 are violated.
POINT VI. MR. MENZIES/ RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION WOULD BE VIOLATED IF EITHER
VERSION OF THIS TRANSCRIPT WERE USED.
This Court has held that the state due process guarantee
contained in Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides
greater protection than the federal due process clause in the
context of suggestive identification procedures.
Case No. 880245 (Utah March 21, 1991).

State v. Ramirez,

In addition, this Court has

indicated that state due process rights may be implicated where a
defendant's right to appeal is violated.
at 705.

State v. Tuttle. 713 P.2d

The nonexistence of an adequate transcript with which

appellate counsel can review for error so severely impedes
Mr. Menzies' ability to pursue an appeal in this case that his state
due process rights are violated.

See generally State v. Smith, 554

S.W.2d 676 (La. 1989).
In addition, Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution may
provide different and greater protection than its federal
counterpart in the fourteenth amendment.

Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d

661, 670 (Utah 1984); State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 705; see also
Article I, § 2 of the Utah Constitution.

In a death penalty case,

where counsel and this Court scrutinize the transcript to ensure
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that the sentence was not rendered in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, an inaccurate transcript prepared by an uncertified
individual violates Mr. Menzies' right to equal protection.
POINT VII. USE OF EITHER TRANSCRIPT WOULD
VIOLATE MR. MENZIES' RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS,
EQUAL PROTECTION AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
Although the right to appeal is not specifically stated
in the federal constitution, once the right to appeal is established
by statute or state constitution, it is included in the concept of
federal due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.

See

Reves v. Delqado, 81 P.R.R. 906, 910 (1960), citing Cole v.
Arkansas. 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 18, 19 (1956); Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S. 214,
215, 216 (1985) (per curiam); Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206,
208, 210 (1951).
In order to adequately pursue an appeal, appellate
counsel must have a complete and accurate transcript of the
proceedings.
(1964).37

See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282

Where appellate counsel is unable to review a complete

and accurate transcript of proceedings, an appellant's federal due
process rights are violated.
In addition, because counsel is unable to effectively
assist a capital defendant on appeal by reviewing the transcript for

37

Although Hardy was not decided on constitutional
grounds, its determination that a complete and accurate transcript
is necessary for appellate counsel to adequately represent a
defendant is nevertheless applicable.
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error or plain error, Mr. Menzies' sixth amendment right to
effective assistance would be violated by the use of either of these
transcripts.
Finally, the use of either transcript would violate
Mr. Menzies' right to equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment since other capital defendants are provided with an
accurate transcript prepared by a certified reporter which can be
reviewed for plain error.
POINT VIII. EX PARTE SUPPLEMENTATION OF RECORD
BY THE STATE VIOLATES UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHTS AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.
In addition to casting additional doubt on the integrity
and qualification of Ms. Lee, the supplementation of the record by
the prosecutor without the knowledge, consent or presence of
Mr. Menzies' defense counsel or the judge violates Mr. Menzies'
right to appear and defend in person an appeal pursuant to
Article I, § 12; his right to due process pursuant to Article I, § 7
and the fourteenth amendment; his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment under Article I, § 9 and the eighth amendment;
and his right to equal protection pursuant to Article I, § 24 and
the fourteenth amendment.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
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ADDENDUM A

ART.

I, § 10

Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In
courts of general jurisdiction except in capital cases, a jury shall consist
of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of
four jurors In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil
cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.

ART. I, § 12

Sec. 12. [Eights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

ART.

I, §24

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

ART. I, § 2

CONSTITUTION OP UTAH

Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit,
and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public
welfare may require.

ART. I, § ^

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived vt life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.

ART.

I, § 9

Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines—Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail &hall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Rule 11. The record on appeal.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and
the clerk of the appellate court. If no such parts of the proceedings are to
be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate
to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of
the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceedings were
otherwise recorded, the appellant shall request from a court transcriber,
certified in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Judicial
Council, a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already on file as
the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties approved by
the appellate court, a person other than a certified court transcriber may
transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate court shall, upon
request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers. The transcriber is
subject to all of the obligations imposed on ronnrtor* hv these ru ] es
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and
sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal
arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together
with such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present
the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court
shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon
approval of the statement by the trial court.
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on
the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall
be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on
appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as
to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the
trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties
a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court.

Rule 26. Appeals.
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed and the
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatically
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended by the
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death has
priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the
Supreme Court.

76-3-206. Capital felony — Death or life imprisonment.
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced
in accordance with Section 76-3-207, and sentence shall be death or life imprisonment as the court or jury, in accordance with this section, shall determine.
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to
automatic review by the Utah State Supreme Court within 60 days after
certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless time is extended an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the Utah State Supreme
Court for good cause shown. Such review by the Utah State Supreme Court
shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard in accordance with
rules promulgated by the Utah State Supreme Court.

78-56-18. Use of titles or abbreviations by certified shorth a n d reporter.
Any person granted a certificate to practice as a certified shorthand reporter shall during its term or any renewal thereof be styled and known as a
certified shorthand reporter. It is unlawful for any other person to assume
such title or use the abbreviation C.S.R. or any other similar words, letters, or
figures to indicate that the person using the same is a certified shorthand
reporter.

78-56-19.

Crimes.

Anv violation of the provisions of this act shall be a misdemeanor.

78-56.11, 78-56-12.

Repealed.

78-56-14. Definition of "shorthand reporter."
The words "shorthand reporter" as used in this act shall be defined to mean
any person who is engaged in the practice of making by use of symbols or
abbreviations a verbatim record of any trial, proceeding, or hearing before
any district court or circuit court or before any referee, master, board, or
commission, of this state.

78-56-15. Appointment of reporters — Eligibility — Certificate.
No person may be appointed to the position of shorthand reporter nor act in
that capacity in any district court or circuit court of this state, or before any
referee, master, board, or commission of this state unless he has received a
certificate from the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing as
provided in this chapter.

78-56-16. Grant of certificate.
Any citizen of the United States at least 18 years of age, of good moral
character, who possesses a high degree of skill and ability in the art of shorthand reporting, and who passes a satisfactory examination as provided in this
chapter, is entitled to a certificate and shall be known as a certified shorthand
reporter.

78-56-17. Appointment of temporary substitutes.
If any regularly appointed certified shorthand reporter is disabled from
performing his duty or is removed from his position, the judge of the court S
s l s t i t S : h ? ? f i e d S h 0 r t h a n d r e P ° r t e r h 3 S b e e n appointed m a f ^ ^ n f a n y
substitute he deems competent to act during the temporary disability of thp
regular reporter and until his successor is appointed.
T i J Z ^ ^ l

78-56-8

JUDICIAL CODE

evidence or proceedings must pay the fees for this to the reporter. If the
defendant in a criminal case desires to have the reporter transcribe his notes
taken on the trial, he must pay the reporter's fees for this or deposit an
equivalent sum with the clerk of the court; but if it appears by affidavit, made
by the defendant in person, that he is impecunious and unable to pay the
reporter's fees for transcribing his notes and that a transcript of the same is
necessary in an appeal on behalf of the defendant, and these facts are not
successfully controverted, the court may order the reporter to transcribe his
notes, or so much of them as the court may deem necessary. In criminal cases
when the proceedings have been transcribed upon the order of the court, the
fees of the reporter shall be certified by the judge to the state auditor for
violation of state statute, the county auditor for violation of county ordinance,
or the city auditor for violation of city code, who shall draw his warrant upon
the treasurer for the amount so certified, and the same shall be paid out of the
appropriate treasury.
(2) Transcripts from electronic recordings in the circuit court produced by
the official court transcriber shall be governed in like manner as provided for
in this section, and compensation shall be at the same rates as provided for in
§ 78-56-4.

78-56-9. Trial fee.
A reporter's fee of $15 shall be collected by the clerk of the court, in each
case, upon the filing of the case, and may be taxed as costs in the action; no
reporters' fee shall be charged or collected in probate matters, unless the same
are contested; then the fee shall be paid by the party contesting. Reporters'
fees so collected by the clerk shall be transmitted quarterly to the state treasurer. In no case shall the state be liable for such fee.

78-56-10. In circuit court — Appointment — Transcripts of
evidence.
Any judge of any circuit court may appoint a competent shorthand reporter
to report the proceedings in any case, or utilize electronic recording of the
proceeding upon the request of any party to the action. Whenever the testimony of any witness in any such case shall be stenographically reported by
such shorthand reporter,or electronically recorded, and thereafter said witness shall die, or be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, any party to the
record may read in evidence the testimony of said witness, when duly certified
by such reporter to be correct, or when the electronic record is accepted by the
court to be correct, in any subsequent trial of, or proceeding had in respect of,
the same cause, subject only to the same objections that might be made if said
witness were testifying in open court.

78-56-5. Assistant reporters — Duties — Compensation.
The judge may appoint an assistant reporter to act in the place of the
regular reporter when the absence, sickness or disability of the court reporter,
or the business of the court, requires it. The assistant reporter shall qualify in
the same way, perform the same duties, receive the same compensation and
collect the same fees as is prescribed for the court reporter; provided, that the
assistant reporter shall receive compensation only for the time he is actually
engaged in such work; and provided further, that when he is appointed owing
to the absence of the court reporter the assistant reporter shall be paid out of
the salary of the regular reporter, except when such absence is on account of
the sickness of the regular reporter, when such compensation shall be paid out
of the state treasury at the same rate and in the same manner as the regular
reporter's salary is paid. The judge shall certify the compensation due the
assistant reporter to the state auditor.

78-56-6. Certified transcripts prima facie correct.
A transcript of a reporter's notes, written in longhand or typewritten, certified by him as being a correct transcript of evidence and proceedings, is prima
facie a correct statement of such evidence and proceedings.

78-56-7. Oath — Bond — Action on bond.
Before any such reporter enters upon the discharge of his duties, he shall
take, subscribe and file the constitutional oath, and give a bond with sufficient surety, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties, in the sum
of $2,500, or such larger sum as the judge shall fix. Said bond shall run to the
state of Utah, but an action thereon may be maintained by any person whose
rights are affected by the failure of the reporter to perform his official duties.

78-56-8. Transcripts — Order by court or by party — Impecunious defendant in criminal case — Transcript from electronic recordings.
(1) In a case where a transcript has been ordered by the court, the fees for
transcribing must be paid by the respective parties to the action or proceeding
in equal proportion, or by such of them and in such proportion as the court in
its discretion may order. In no case shall a transcript be taxed as costs, unless
ordered either by a party or by the court. The reporter shall not be required in
any civil case to transcribe his notes until the fees for this are tendered to
him, or a sufficient amount to cover the same is deposited in court for that
purpose. The party ordering the reporter to transcribe any portion of the

PART

VII

COURT REPORTERS AND STENOGRAPHERS

CHAPTER 56
GENERAL PROVISIONS
78-56-1.1. District courts — Appointment.
The court administrator shall appoint a certified shorthand reporter with
the approval of the district judge to report the proceedings in each division of
the district courts. The certified shorthand reporters shall hold office during
the pleasure of the court administrator, and the district judge.

78-56-2. Duties of shorthand reporter.
The shorthand reporter shall attend all sessions of the court, and take full
stenographic notes of the evidence given and of all proceedings of each session,
except when the judge dispenses with his services in a particular cause or for a
portion of the proceedings. The reporter shall file with the clerk forthwith the
original stenographic notes required to be taken at a trial or hearing, and,
when requested, shall with reasonable diligence furnish the defendant in a
criminal cause, and a party to a civil cause, a transcript of the stenographic
notes of the evidence and proceedings, or any part of it, upon payment of the
fees as provided.

78-56-3. Compensation — Traveling expenses — Frequency of payment.
The compensation of a court reporter shall be fixed in accordance with
salary schedules for state employees for attendance upon the sessions of the
court. He shall also be paid for traveling expenses actually and necessarily
incurred in the performance of his duties outside the county in which he
resides. Such compensation and expenses shall be certified by the judge to the
state auditor, who shall draw his warrant upon the state treasurer for the

78-56-4. Compensation — Transcripts and copies.
The compensation of a court reporter for transcribing into longhand or
typewriting his stenographic notes of evidence and proceedings, or any part
thereof, shall be 800 per folio for an original, and 200 per folio for additional
copies, when furnished to the party initially ordering the transcript. If two or
more parties to an action are to be furnished a copy, the reporter shall receive
30# per folio for the first copy furnished each party, and 200 per folio for each
additional copy furnished that party, provided all copies are ordered before
the reporter commences the first transcription of his notes.

58-1-11. License application.
(1) Each license applicant shall apply to the division in writing upon forms
prepared and furnished by the division. Each application shall contain proof of
the particular qualifications required of the applicant, shall be verified by the
applicant, and shall be accompanied by the appropriate fees.
(2) Before any person is issued a license under this title, all requirements
for that license as established under this title and by rule shall be met.
(3) If all requirements are met for the specific license, the division shall
issue the license.

58-1-12. Reciprocal license.
The division may issue a license without examination to a person who has
been licensed in any state, district, or territory of the United States or in any
foreign country, whose education, experience, and examination requirements
are, or were at the time the license was issued, equal to those of this state.
Before any person may be issued a license under this section, he shall produce
satisfactory evidence of his identity and good standing in his occupation or
profession.

77-1-6, Rights of defendant. (1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses
n his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor
a husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon
a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial
by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, unon a inHcrmpnt hv

ADDENDUM B

DISTRICT COURT

IVGV
BROOKE C. WELLS, #3421
FRANCES M. PALACIOS, #25 02
JOAN C. WATT, #3967
RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT, CONVICTION AND
SENTENCE AND/OR FOR NEW
TRIAL

v.
RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Defendant/Appellant.

District Court No. CR86-887
Supreme Court No. 880161
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO

COMES NOW, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, by and through counsel,
BROOKE C. WELLS, FRANCES M. PALACIOS, JOAN C. WATT, and RICHARD G.
UDAY, and moves the Court to set aside the judgment and conviction
for Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital
offense, and the sentence of death entered on March 23, 1988, or,
alternatively, to grant a new trial of both the guilt and penalty
phases in the above-captioned case.

This motion is made pursuant to

Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987) and Rule 24, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure (1989) on the following grounds:

1.

The transcript of proceedings prepared in this case

does not accurately reflect the proceedings held in the trial court
as demonstrated in the attached examples.
2.

Failure to provide an accurate transcript of

proceedings in a capital homicide case violates Mr. Menzies' rights
to appeal pursuant to Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah;
to due process of law pursuant to Article I, § 7 of the Constitution
of Utah; to uniform operation of the laws pursuant to Article I,
§ 24 of the Constitution of Utah and equal protection pursuant to
Article I, § 2 of the Constitution of Utah; to effective assistance
of counsel pursuant to Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah;
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment or punishment inflicted
with unnecessary rigor pursuant to Article I, § 9 of the
Constitution of Utah; to have the right to a jury trial in a capital
case remain inviolate pursuant to Article I, § 10 of the
Constitution of Utah; as well as Defendant's statutory rights,
including his right to appeal (Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1982)),
right to assistance of counsel on appeal (Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2
(1953 as amended)), and right to be provided with an accurate
transcript of proceedings (Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-5 (1988)).
3.

Failure to provide an accurate transcript of

proceedings in a capital homicide case violates Mr. Menzies' rights

- 2 -

to appeal, due process and equal protection of the laws pursuant to
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States; his right to
effective assistance of counsel pursuant to Amendment VI of the
Constitution of the United States; and his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to Amendment VIII of the
Constitution of the United States.
4.

Ex parte supplementation of the transcript by the

State without the presence, knowledge or consent of defense counsel/
Defendant or the trial judge after entry of judgment violates
Mr. Menzies1 rights to appeal pursuant to Article I, § 12 of the
Constitution of Utah; to due process pursuant to Article I, § 7 of
the Constitution of Utah; to confront witnesses against him and to
have effective assistance of counsel pursuant to Article I, § 12 of
the Constitution of Utah; to an inviolate jury trial in a capital
case pursuant to Article I, § 10 of the Constitution of Utah; to
uniform application of the laws pursuant to Article I, § 24 of the
Constitution of Utah and equal protection pursuant to Article I, § 2
of the Constitution of Utah; and to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment under Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of Utah; to
appear and defend in person or by counsel (Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6
(1953 as amended)); and various other statutory rights.
5.

Ex parte supplementation of the transcript by a

- 3 -

prosecutor without the presence, knowledge or consent of defense
counsel, Defendant or the trial judge violates Mr. Menzies1 rights
to appeal, due process and equal protection pursuant to
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States; to confront
witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel
pursuant to Amendment VI of the Constitution of the United States;
and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to
Amendment VIII of the Constitution of the United States.
6.

The condition of the transcripts makes it impossible

for the Utah Supreme Court to perform its required function of
automatically reviewing death penalty cases as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) (1953 as amended), § 76-3-207(4) (1953 as
amended), and § 77-35-26(10) (Supp. 1988) as outlined in State v.
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988
(1982); and as further defined in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,
551-3 (Utah 1987), and State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1021-22
(Utah 1989).
Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court, based
on the supporting documents, set this matter for an evidentiary
hearing and oral argument and thereafter set aside judgment,
conviction and sentence entered on March 23, 1988 and/or order a new

- 4 -

trial as the result of the inaccurate record and/or improper
supplementation by the State,
DATED this

jo

day of November, 1989.

¥m^

BROOK I
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

FRANCES M. PALACIOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

<0-(.td*M
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney^nr Defendant/Appellant

IARD G .

(M
UDA\3

A t t o r n e y for

-

5

-

Defendanfe^Appellant

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that Defendant's
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Conviction and Sentence and/or for New
Trial will come on regularly for hearing on the V^L
of

Aluji**JkiA.

t 1989, at the hour of

day

^/;0Q ^ J , before the

Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Third District Court Judge,

Please govern

yourselves accordingly.
DATED this

/ST day of November, 1989,

L,

JROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

h^JnJAjcu^
FRANCES M. PALACIOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

<7k.e.u)aix
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney^-i-e-r

Defendant/Appellant

IARD G. UDA1
Attorney for Defendaryt/Appellant
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and the
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this

day of November, 1989.
DELIVERED B>

NOV 15 195f0. LOYOLA

- 7 -

NOV 1 5 1989
T,J,WiNNiRfiREN

ADDENDUM C

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114

January 3 # 1990
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
CRAIG LUDWIG
CLERK OF THE COURT
24 0 EAST FOURTH SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
&

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Ralph Leroy Menzies,
Defendant and Appellant.

*i»

4*1

No. 880161

Appellant's motion to file an overlength brief is granted,
not to exceed 200 pages. Appellant's motion for an extension of
time to file his opening brief is granted, the same to be filed
within 60 days after the record is settled; and appellant's motion
to have the trial court conduct the Rule 11 proceedings is granted
and the case is remanded for the purpose of:
1.

Resolution of the issues pertaining to the court reporter.

2. Settlement of the record in the context of the issues
presented in each of the motions before this Court, and
otherwise determine the adequacy of the record.
3.

Resolution of defendant's motion for a new trial.

In light of the foregoing, the Court declines to rule on the
remaining motions presented.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

ADDENDUM D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
RALPH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO.

:

SUPREME COURT NO. 88 0161

LEROY MENZIES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

This
1990.
the

:

matter

came

on

for

CR-86-887

hearing on the 6th day of July,

Present for the State of Utah was Barbara
Attorney

General's

and

represented

Uday,

Richard

G.

defendant
Joan

was

C.

present

Watt,

Holbrook, and also present were Brooke C. Wells and
Palacios.

and

Elizabeth

Frances

M.

The purpose of this hearing was to either reconsider

the Court's ruling orally issued on June
alternative

from

Office, and Richard G. MacDougall from

the County Attorney's Office,
by

Bearnson

to

clarify

in

4,

to

transcript

case.

the

or

in

the

writing the oral ruling it made on

June 4, 1990 requiring trial counsel
of

1990,

above-captioned

meet

and

The

review
Court

the

having

reviewed the materials submitted, hereby enters its ruling.

STATE V. MENZIES

1.

PAGE TWO

Defendant's

Motion

for

MEMORANDUM DECISION

New

Trial based on Ms. Tauni

Lee's Utah licensure status is denied.
evidence

the

Court

court reporter
qualified

feels

for

to

the

report

although

State

of

Based on

testimony

and

she was not licensed as a
Utah,

she

was

de

facto

this trial based on her training, testing

and experience.
2.

Based

on

the

testimony and evidence, the Court rules

that the burden is on the defendant/appellant to establish
the

record

is

that

incorrect and that if there are any errors, the

errors cannot be corrected with due diligence and

further

that

such errors are prejudicial even after correction.
3.

Procedure for examining the transcript's accuracy:
(a)

at the Utah

Ms.
Law

representative

Lee
and

of

will
Justice

the

present at this time.
procedure

of

Ms.

proofread in detail the transcript

Lee

State

Center

by

July

20,

1990.

A

of Utah and the defendant may be

Since this is

essentially

proofreading

a

mechanical

the record along with her

notes, it is not necessary that a record

be

made

by

a

court

preferably

trial

reporter.
(b)
counsel,

Subsequently,

should

complete

representatives,
an

independent

transcript and identify any errors or
be completed by September 21, 1990.

omissions.

review
This

of

the

should

PAGE THREE

STATE V. MENZIES

(c)

Any

errors,

matters will be heard
starting

at

9:00

discrepancies,

in

a.m.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

open
A

court

on

determination

omissions

or

September

24,

omissions

such

errors

can be corrected, and also whether such errors or

omissions are prejudicial to the
accurate

1990

will be made by the

Court if there are errors or omissions and whether
or

other

record

extent

that

a

complete

and

cannot be made for review by the Supreme Court

of the State of Utah.

The defendant, Mr. Ralph

Leroy

Menzies,

shall be present at this hearing.
4.

The

obligation

legal
to

basis

for

reconstruct

the

is

its

may

be

Whetton v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d

47

the

problems with the transcript.

Court's

record

decision

where

there

(1972) .
5.

After the review process, the

inaccuracies

of

the

transcript

burden
will

of

proving
be

the

on

the

that

the

(1953

as

defendant/appellant.
6.

The

presumption
amended),

Court
of

Utah

will

make

Code

Ann.,

a

determination

Section

78-56-6

that the transcript is correct will be made after the

review process as above noted, prior to the time the
is

prepared

review.

for

transcript

submission to the Supreme Court for appellate

STATE V. MENZIES

7.

All

PAGE FOUR

objections

procedure taken by

the

requested
Court

will

MEMORANDUM DECISION

by

defendant

as

be

noted

a

as

to

the

standing

objection throughout these proceedings,
8-

Finally, because

extremely

important

both

this
for

is
the

a

capital

case

in

is

defendant and the State of

Utah, the Court requests the cooperation and indulgence
parties

which

of

all

order that we may efficiently and properly conclude

this matter in the shortest time possible.
.

/ *

Dated this (n ~~ day of July, 1990.

ADDENDUM E

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAN R. LARSEN (4865)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022

DEC 2j> ....

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

ORDER

v.
District Court No. CR86-887
Supreme Court No. 880161

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Defendant/Appellant.

Judgefc^u-iig T'TIMII*J

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing pursuant
to Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, on December 19,
1990, at the hour of 8:30 a.m.

Defendant was present with

counsel Joan C. Watt, Richard G. Uday, Brooke C. Wells and
Frances M. Palacios.

The State was represented by Dan R. Larsen,

Assistant Attorney General, and Richard G. MacDougall, Deputy
Salt Lake County Attorney.

Based upon the Court's full review of

the original transcripts, the evidence presented at the Rule
11(h) hearing on December 3, 1990, and the considerable time and
effort expended in an attempt to correct alleged errors in the
transcript, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as
follows:

1.

Defendant's Renewed Motion to Set Aside Judgment

and/or for New Trial is denied.
2.

The original transcript, prepared by the

notereader, shall be transmitted to the Utah Supreme Court based
upon the finding that despite numerous errors, the original
transcript is sufficiently accurate to afford defendant a full
and fair review of his issues to be raised on appeal.
3.

The California transcript, interlineated by

defendant's counsel and containing Ms. Tauni Lee's version of her
reporter notes, shall also be transmitted to the Utah Supreme
Court as part of the record pn appeal.
DATED this

3-*

day of b&CriLM#£AJ

199(2-

BY THE COURT:

X Jc^e
IYMONC S. UNO
'
Third D i s t r i c t Court Judge
Form:
\ CERTIFY THAT THfS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF
UTAH.

DEPUTY COLRT CLERK

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Richard G. Uday,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, Utah,

84111, this "^4 ~Vay of December, 1990.

I

ii
r\

'L, ~-/Z

ADDENDUM F

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
Norman H Bangerter
Governor ,J
David L Buhler j
Executive Director 2
David E Robinson
Division Director

Heber M Wells Bu Id ng
160 East 300 South/P 0 Box 45802
Salt Lake City Utah 84145 0802

(801)530-6628

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIftN OF RECORDS

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a diligent search made of all records maintained
by the Utah State Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing,
reveals whether an official certified shorthand reporters license has ever
been issued to: Tauni D. Byrd aka Tauni D. Lee, and whether such license, if
any, is current or has expired.

It is hereby certified that no license was or has been issued by this
office for Tauni D. Byrd aka Tauni D. Lee.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am a public officer of the State of Utah by
virtue of Title 58 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and that I am the legal keeper
and custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah State Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing and if such records do exist anywhere
they would be in my control and possession.

This certificate is made for use as court evidence or otherwise in
compliance with RULE 44(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 1st day of
December, 1989.

George P. Weiler, License Coordinator
Utah State Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing

MAY 1 7 1990
SALTUWEC'JjJNgf

%&-

RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

AFFIDAVIT (IN RESPONSE TO
STATE'S AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE P.
WEILER DATED MAY 10, 1990)

v.
RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF UTAH

District Court No. CR86-887
Supreme Court No. 880161
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO

)

) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
I, GEORGE P. WEILER, declare under penalty of perjury that
the following is true and correct:
1.

I am the License Coordinator of the Utah State Division

of Occupational & Professional Licensing; I have been so employed
for the last fifteen years.
2.

As Coordinator of the Utah State Division of

Occupational & Professional Licensing, I supervise the licensing for
ten professional boards.

3.

One of the ten professional boards that I supervise is

the Certified Shorthand Reporters Licensing Board.
4.

On May 10, 1990, I signed an Affidavit prepared by the

State in the above-entitled case.
(a)

In point five (5) of that Affidavit, I

indicated three ways in which applicants could obtain a
Utah Certified Shorthand Reporter license.

The statutory

authority I relied on for that statement is Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-1-12 (1985).
(b)

Both points five (5) and six (6) of that

Affidavit state that Ms. Lee "could" or "would" have been
accepted for licensure in Utah.

By way of clarification,

such acceptance is not automatic but must necessarily have
been accomplished only after Ms. Lee made formal
application to become a Utah licensed Certified Shorthand
Reporter.

The requisite application process requires the

applicant to provide proof of any out-of-state licensure
relied on by the applicant and to provide satisfactory
evidence of good standing in the profession.

Because

Ms. Lee did not apply for a Utah license, no such
information was presented for review by the licensing
agency.

- 2

-

DATED t h i s

day o f May, 1990

w/sMe

GEORQg P. WEILER

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this

JlS* ay of May,

1990.

NOTARY
N6TARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBUC
AUCtA A. REEVES
180 E. 300 So. 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
COMMISSION EXPIRES

«?•/•- ?/
^E*'

STATE OP UTAH

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and the
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this

/ "7 day of May, 1990.

ADDENDUM G

RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880161
Priority No. 1

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

)
) ss:

SfiMAweA/ro)

COUNTY OF

I, RICK BLACK, declare under penalty of perjury that the
following is true and correct:
1.

I am the Executive Officer of the California Certified

Shorthand Reporters Board.
2.

The California Certified Shorthand Reporters Board is

the licensing agency for Certified Shorthand Reporters in the State
of California and is located at 1021 "O" Street, Room A-153,
Sacramento, California 95814, telephone (916) 445-5101.
3.

As Executive Officer, I am familiar with the

record-keeping system of Certified Shorthand Reporters in the State
of California and am able to research the records to determine the
license status of Certified Shorthand Reporters in the State of
California.

4.

I am acquainted with Tauni D. Lee, aka Tauni D. Byrd.

Ms. Lee was originally licensed as a Certified Shorthand Reporter in
California.

In July of 1985, she was assigned the license number

6770.
5.

Ms. Lee's California Certified Shorthand Reporter

license expired and became delinquent in April of 1987. Ms. Lee
remained unlicensed as a Certified Shorthand Reporter in California
from that date until April of 1989 when she renewed the same.
6.

Ms. Lee has had numerous problems in the State of

California regarding the timeliness and quality of her work. She
has been served with four Orders to Show Cause by the Court of
Appeals of the State of California, First Appellate District, for
transcription problems.

Ms. Lee has been declared not competent to

act as a Certified Shorthand Reporter by that court, and she has
been sanctioned several times as well.

See Golden Oak Enterprises,

Inc., Et Al. v. Manor Development Co., Inc., Et. Al.; Cindy Lee
Hebbring v. Jess Eugene Hebbring; Santiago Nunez v. Hedwig Young,
et al.; and Henry, et al v. Savelli.
7.

As the licensing agency in the State of California for

Certified Shorthand Reporters, the Attorney General's Office of the
State of California represents us in any matters regarding
licenses.

Our office has requested the Attorney General of

California to file an Accusation against Ms. Lee in preparation for
a formal disciplinary hearing regarding her California Certified
Shorthand Reporter's license.

DATED this

13

day of December, 1989.

U<- £ & J L _
RICK BLACK

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /3

7T/-

day of

December, 1989.
-is.

^

,•»..^

^

A

^

^

n

^

OFFICIAL S€AL
DAVID C NOREN
HJTA&YPU8UC CALIFORNIA
SACRAMENTO COUNTY
tfrSOWMISSlQN EXPIRES A(J8 23.1991

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in
SrtC/2

Amgr/y/T-O

County, California

My Commission Expires;

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, this

day of December, 1989.

ADDENDUM H

COURT OF APPEAL OP THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE

FILED

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

APR 13 1988
Court Qf Appeal • First App. [
RON D. BARROW

By.

DEPUTY

GOLDEN OAK ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL. vs. MANOR DEVELOPMENT CO.,
INC., ET AL., A037262, Division One, Sonoma County No. 123722
CINDY LEE HEBBRING vs. JESS EUGENE HEBBRING, A038187, Division Pive,
Napa County N~. 48395
BY THE COURT:
TAUNI BYRD, Official Reporter (or Official Reporter Pro
Tempore) for the Superior Courts, Counties of Sonoma and
Napa, respectively, is hereby declared not competent to
act as an Official Reporter in^any'courVof any county
within the jursidiction of the State of California,
pursuant to Government Code section 69944.

APR 1 3 1888
Dated

lOV/, P.J.

p.

J,

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I declare that on April 21f 1988 I served the attached order in
said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed
envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid/ in the United States
mail at San Francisco, California addressed as follows:
Tauni Byrd, CSR, % H Dixon Hindley, Clerk, 240 East 400 South/
P.O. Box I860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Tauni Byrd/ 798 E. 7440 South/ #20/ Hidvale# Utah 84047
Division of Registration, P.O. Box 5802, 160 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84110
Donald Jones, President, Utah Shorthand Reporters Association,
2223 East 1300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Jim Campbell
Deputy Clerk

TATE O F CAUFORNIA

louxt txi Appeal
FIRST OiSTRJCT

L5

S T A T E BUILDING
F R A N C I S C O . CA

94102

i ^ r - i c!"'* •:•
cj

s£j • \\

,. £uuM*J-

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Court of Appeal
SAN FRANCISCO 9 4 1 0 2

§tate of California

4 154 STATE BUILD4NG
CIVIC CENTER
537-1894

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
J A M E S R, BRIGHTON, AOMIN. ASST.

oepunes
OtANA ClNL

CHIEF

R O N D. B A R R O W . CLERK

May 2 7 ,

1988

DEPUTY

L E O A . WEJSSMANN
CYNTHIA B O W I E
HENRIETTA C R U Z
S U S A N THAYER
J A M E S CAMPBELL
J O A N TAYLOR
CHAINING HOO

J tortNDANrs
o

>-

'.SET1

PENNY KEELEY. SECRETARY

Ronald W. Gibson
Deputy Court Administrator
State of Utah
Administrative Office of the Courts
230 South 500 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Mr, Gibson:
In answer to your letter of May 11, 1988 concerning Court
Reporter Tauni Byrd, Ms. Byrd was declared not competent to act
as an official reporter in California due to her failure to timely
file transcripts in the cases of Golden Oak Enterprises, Inc. v.
Manor Development Co., Inc. (A037262) and Marriage of Hebbring
(A038187).
In the case of Golden Oak Enterprises, an order to show
cause was issued directing Ms. Byrd to appear before this court
to explain her f*_j_l HT-P +r> fjlg
fchg^j:^^jziB±^
in a timely fashion
and a sanction of $100 was imposed for the lateness in excess of
one men "£5T When she failed to pay the sanction, the court declared
her not competent to act as a court reporter in California.
In the case of Marriage of Hebbring, the same circumstances
arose because of late filing of the transcripts. Her tardiness was
in excess of three months and she did not respond to requests to
produce the transcripts. She failed to appear after the issuance
of an order to show cause and was sanctioned $600, and declared
not competent: to act as a cour- reporter in California.
The sanctions have now been paid and the transcripts have
been filed. In order for her to be declared competent again to
act as a court reporter in California, Ms .„_Byxd-must-submit a
request to this court for her reinstatement as a court reporter

Page 2
Ronald W. Gibson

in good standing together with any supporting documents she wishes
to attach. This court would then act on that request.
Very tpily

you^s,

RON D. BARROW
Clerk of the Court
cc:

Tauni Byrd

ADDENDUM I

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP, Attorney General
of the State of California
2 JEANNE C WERNER
Deputy Attorney General
3 California Department of Justice
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Room 6200
4 San Francisco, California 94102
Telephone: (415) 464-3787
5
Attorneys for Complainant
6
1

BEFORE THE
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS BOARD
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

In t h e Matter of the Accusation
Against:

NO. 88-03-0426

TAUNI D. (BYRD) LEE
401 North 900 East #26
Provo, Utah 84601

ACCUSATION

C e r t i f i e d Shorthand Reporter's
L i c e n s e No. CSR 6770,
Respondent.

16
17

The Complainant alleges:

18

PARTIES

19

1.

Complainant, Richard J. Black, is the Executive

20

Officer of the California State Certified Shorthand Reporters

21

Board

22

solely in his official capacity.

23

(hereinafter the 'Board") and brings this accusation

2.

On or about July 5, 1985, Certified Shorthand

24

Reporter's License No. CSR 6770 was issued by the Board to Tauni

25

D. Byrd, whose name later became Tauni D. Lee (hereinafter

26

"respondent").

27

April 30, 1987, was renewed on April 25, 1989 and is current

Said license expired in a delinquent status on

1

through April 30, 1990.

2

Board is: 401 North 900 East #26, Provo, Utah 84601.

3

The address of record on file with the

JURISDICTION

4

3.

This accusation is brought under the authority of

5

section 8025 of the California Business and Professions Code

6

(hereinafter "Code"), which provides that the Board may suspend

7

or revoke a certificate under certain circumstances, including:

8

(c) Fraud, dishonesty,... willful violation of duty;

9

gross incompetency in practice or unprofessional conduct, (which)

10

includes... acts contrary to professional standards concerning...

11

filing and retention of notes... delivery, execution and

12

certification of transcripts...and any provision of law

13

substantially related to the duties of a certified shorthand

14

reporter;

15

(d) Repeated unexcused failure, whether or not willful,

16

to transcribe notes of cases pending on appeal and to file the

17

transcripts thereof within the time required by law or to

18

transcribe or file notes of other proceedings within the time

19

required by law or agreed by contract; and

20

(e) Violation of this chapter (Business and Professions

21

Code, Division 3, Chapter 13. Shorthand Reporters) or the rules

22

and regulations adopted by the board.

23

4.

Section 8024.2 of the Code provides that each

24

certificate holder must notify the Board in writing of any change

25

of address.

26
27

5.

Section 8016 of the Code requires that persons who

are appointed, on and after January 1, 1983, to the position of

1

official reporter or pro tempore official reporter of any court,

2

as defined in the Government Code, are required to have a

3

certificate in full force and effect issued by the Board.

4

Government Code sets forth additional requirements for official

5

court reporters in Articles 9-12, commencing with Section 69941.

The

6
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

7
6.

8
9

Respondent is subject to disciplinary action under

section 8025 of the Code in that she failed to file a transcript

10

in a timely manner as required by law.

11

follows:

12

A.

The circumstances are as

On or about May 26, 1987, transcripts were

13

requested in Marin County Municipal Court Action No. V8770367

14

(Henry v. Savelli).

15

1987, received and cashed a check shortly thereafter, and the

16

transcript was filed late, on February 17, 1988.

17

7.

Respondent provided an estimate on July 15,

Incorporating by reference the allegations in

18

paragraph 6 above, cause for discipline exists in that said

19

conduct constitutes the willful violation of duty; gross

20

incompetency; and acts contrary to professional standards

21

regarding the availability, delivery and execution or

22

transcripts, all in violation of Section 8025(c).

23

8.

Incorporating by reference the allegations of

24

paragraph 6 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action

25

under section 8025(d) of the code in that said conduct

26

constitutes the repeated unexcused failure to transcribe a

27

proceeding within the time required by law or by contract.

SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION

1
2

9. Respondent is subject to disciplinary action under

3

section 8025 of the Code in that, in two appeals pending in the

4

First Appellate Division, Fifth District, of the California Court

5

of Appeal, she failed to file transcripts in a timely manner as

6

required by law.

7

The circumstances are as follows:

A. The transcripts in Napa County Case No. 48395

8

(Hebrina) and Sonoma County Case No. 123722 (Golden Oak) were

9

both filed late in the Court of Appeal. The Hebrina transcript

10

was requested in July 1987 and was filed on February 24, 1988.

11

The Court of Appeal, after granting repeated requests for

12

extension of time, imposed sanctions of $500 in the Hebrina case

13

and $100 in the Golden Oak case. On April 13, 1988, the Court

14

filed an order declaring respondent not competent to act as an

15

Official Reporter in any court of any county in California,

16

pursuant to Government Code section 69944.

17

attached hereto as Exhibit A and is incorporated herein as though

18

fully set forth.

19

rescinded nor has respondent petitioned the court for

20

reinstatement.

21

10.

Said Order is

Said order of incompetency has not been

Incorporating by reference the allegations of

22

paragraph 9 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action

23

under section 8025(c) of the code in that said conduct, with

24

respect to each case, constitutes unprofessional conduct; the

25

willful violation of duty; and

26
27

11.

gross incompetency in practice.

Incorporating by reference the allegations of

paragraph 9 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action

1

under section 8025(d) of the code in that said conduct, with

2

respect to each case, constitutes the repeated unexcused failure

3

to transcribe notes of cases pending on appeal and to file the

4

transcripts thereof within the time required by law.

5
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

6
12.

7

Respondent is subject to disciplinary action in

8

that, in the case Walsh v. The Pool Scene, Inc., Marin Municipal

9

Court Case No. V891687, she reported said case on October 4,

10

1989, and, after having been repeatedly requested to prepare a

11

transcript in preparation for the next scheduled hearing in the

12

matter, did so only after obtaining an advance of $475.00, far in

13

excess of the actual cost of said transcript.

14

to deliver the transcript to the requesting attorney, Nancy P.

15

McCarthy, leaving it finally with another party, and has refused

16

to date to reimburse Ms. McCarthy's client for an overpayment in

17

said case.

18
19

She then refused

Respondent represented to Ms. McCarthy that the cost
was $341.50, which is in excess of the amount allowable pursuant

20 II to Government Code section 69950 (70 cents per folio [100
21

words],given that respondent's price for a 101 page transcript

22

would equal 4.83 folios per page when the maximum that can

23

physically be typed on a 28-line page is 3.5 folios per page.

24

The actual amount charged should be no more than $265.00 and may

25

in fact be significantly less, as Ms. McCarthy's estimate, having

26 I reviewed the completed transcript, is $141.40.
27

13. Incorporating by reference the allegations of
paragraph 12, respondent has subjected her certificate to
discipline in that said conduct violates section 8025(c) in that
it constitutes fraud; dishonesty; the willful violation of duty;
unprofessional conduct; and/or the violation of Government Code
section 69950; and is contrary to professional standards
regarding delivery and execution of transcripts.
14.

Incorporating by reference the allegations of

paragraph 12 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action
under section 8025(d) of the code in that said conduct
constitutes the repeated unexcused failure to transcribe a
proceeding within the time required by law or by contract.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
15.

Incorporating by reference the allegations of

paragraph 9 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action
under section 8025(c) of the code in that she served as an
official court reporter pro tempore in Santa Clara County during
a period beginning in March 1990, through April 19, 1990,
notwithstanding the order of the Court filed April 13, 1988
(Exhibit A) declaring her incompetent to do so. Said conduct is
unprofessional conduct, violates the law, and is fraudulent and
dishonest.
16. Incorporating by reference the allegations of
paragraphs 9, and 12 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary
action under section 8025 (c) of the code in that she served as
an official court reporter pro tempore in Marin County in October

1 111989, notwithstanding the order of the Court filed April 13, 1988
2 II (Exhibit A) declaring her incompetent to do so. Said conduct is
3

unprofessional conduct, violates the law, and is fraudulent and

4

dishonest,

5
6

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
17. Respondent has subjected her certificate to

7

discipline under sections 8025(e) in conjunction with 8024.5 of

8

the code in that she has failed to notify the board in writing of

9

her change in address. Respondent's address of record on file

10

with the Board is as alleged in paragraph 2 above, whereas in

11

truth and in fact, respondent was living in California and

12

working as a court reporter in California in October 1989 and

13

April 1990, as alleged in paragraphs 12 and 15 above.

14

18. Incorporating by reference the allegations of

15

paragraphs 9, 12, and 15, respondent has subjected her

16

certificate to discipline under section 8025(c) for

17 I unprofessional conduct in that her failure to notify the board of
18 II her current California address constitutes misrepresentation
19

and/or fraud and/or dishonesty in light of the fact that she is

20

residing and working as an official court reporter pro tempore in

21

California in violation of the court's order.

PRAYER

1
2

WHEREFORE, the complainant requests that a hearing be

3

held on the matters herein alleged, and that following said

4

hearing, the Board issue a decision:

5

1.

Revoking or suspending Certified Shorthand'

6

Reporter's License Number CSR 6770, heretofore issued to

7

respondent Tauni D. (Byrd) Lee;

8
9
10

2.

Taking such other and further action as the Board

deems proper.

DATED:

QjChrf\ if

MP

11
12
13

t

14
15

\LkjK^ju&MrfAjAJA

RICHARD J. BLACK
/Executive Officer
^Board of Certified Shorthand Reporters
Department of Consumer Affairs
State of California

16
Complainant
17
03587110SF88AD1936
8
9
0

EXHIBIT 'A"

COURT Or APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE

FIL0I

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
Courf sf A t p s ^ , fist App
RWCTBARRO
"•"—£-?UT

GOLDEN OAK EN?
INC., ET AL.

N C , ET AL. vs. MANOR DEVELOPMENT CO.,
vision One, Sonoma Councy No. 123722

CINDY LEE HEBSRiT?G-vs. JESS EUGENE HE33RING, A038187, Division Five,
Napa County N~. 48395
BY THE COURT:
TAUNI BYRD, Official Reporter (or Official Reporter Fro
Tempore) for the Superior Courts, Counties of Sonoma and
Napa, respectively, is hereby declared not competent to
act as an Official Reporter in any court of any councy
within the jursidiction of the State of California,
pursuant to Government Code section 69944.

Dated

APR

i3 m
.

/

PROOF OF SERVICE BY KAIL

I declare that on April 13, 1988 I served the attached order in
said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed
envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States
mail at San Francisco, California addressed as follows:

Office of the County Clerk, Sonoma County Superior Court, 600
Administration Drive, Santa Rosa, California 95401
Eeve T. Lewis, County Clerk, Hall of Justice, 600 Administration
Drive, Box 1419, Santa Rosa, California 95402
Tauni Byrd, CSR, % H Dixon Hindley, Clerk, 240 East 400 South,
P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Steven Hargrove, 1555 Marlow Road, Santa Rosa, California

95401

Richard Black, Executive Director, Certified Shorthand Reporters
Board, 1020 "N" Street, Sacramento, California 95814

Jim Campbell
Deputy Clerk

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE

FIIEC

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
Court 9f3Q?2l

GOLDEN OAK ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL. vs. MANOR DEVELOPMENT v.^. ,
INC., ET AL., A037262, Division One, Sonoma County No. 123V^2
CINDY LEE HE3BRING vs. JESS EUGENE HES3RING,! AO 38187,'') Division Five,
Napa County No. 48395
-v
BY THE COUR3
TAUNI BYRD, Official Reporter (or Official Reporter Pro
Tempore) for the Superior Courts, Counties of Sonoma and
Napa, respectively, is hereby declared not competent to
act as an Official Reporter in any court of any county
within the jursidiction of the State of California,
pursuant to Government Code section 69944.

Dated

APR 1 3 m

^rUi^

P b57

SCTd-Dai

RECEIPT FOP. CERTIFIED MAIL

RNIA

FILEI

lest'Cteo De»»*ef? ^**'

GOLDEN OAK EN-ERPRISI ^
INC., ET AL., A 0 3 7 2 6 . ^

Re!y»n Recent sno-^i
:o *rof» J^S Oa:e OeReturn R*ce«Ot $no *•«•:; •*? *"*""•
0a!«? arz Aac**s w* Ce--*r'.
O T A L Postage a^a f w ?

CINDY LEE HEBBRING v ^ l
N a P a County No. 4339 ^ g

Dated

APR 1 3 «88

JLOPMEN7,
NO. 123
37^, D: v i s i o n

Po»tf-a'» 3; U**:e'

i/kA}^

Five,

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I declare that on April 13, 1988 I served the attached order in
said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed
envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States
mail in San Francisco, California addressed as follows:

Office of the County Clerk, Napa County Superior Court, Post
Office Box 880, Napa, California 94559
Tauni Byrd, 798 e. 7440 SO. #20, Midvale, Utah 84047
Janice F. Norton, County Clerk, Courthouse, Room 3, Post Office
Box 880, Napa, California 94559
Diane Erickson, 825 Brown Street, Room 200, Napa CA

94559

Richard Black, Executive Director,Certified Shorthand Reporters
Board, 1020 "N" Street, Sacramento, California 95314

Jim Campbell
Deputy Clerk

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP, Attorney General
of the State of California
2 JEANNE C. WERNER
Deputy Attorney General
3 California Department of Justice
2101 Webster
4 Oakland, CA 94612-3049
MAILING ADDRESS: 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Room 6200
5 San Francisco, California 94102
Telephone: (415) 464-3787
6
Attorneys for Complainant
7
1

8
9
10
11

BEFORE THE
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS BOARD
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

12
13
14
15
16

I n t h e M a t t e r of t h e Accusation
Against:

NO. 88-03-0426

TAUNI D. (BYRD) LEE
401 North 900 East #26
Provo, Utah 84601

MOTION TO AMEND
ACCUSATION AND PROPOSED
AMENDMENT

17
18
19

Certified Shorthand Reporter's
License No. CSR 6770,
Respondent

20
21
22
23

The Complainant, Richard J. Black, Executive Officer of

24

the California State Certified Shorthand Reporters Board,

25

requests that the accusation in this matter be amended as follows

26

to conform to the proof adduced in the hearing on this

27

accusation. Attached to this motion are certified copies of

1

documents on file in tne comx or Appeal m

2

this motion.

runner support oi

3
FOR AN ADDITIONAL CAUSE OF ACTION

4
5
6

19. Respondent is subject to disciplinary action under

7

section 8025 of the Code in that, in yet another appeal pending

8

in the First Appellate Division, Fifth District, of the

9

California Court of Appeal, she failed to file transcripts in a

10

timely manner as required by law.

II

follows:

12

The circumstances are as

A. The transcript in Marin County Case No. 121365,

13

Nunez v. Young, (A039760) was filed nearly five months late. The

14

notice of appeal was filed August 27, 1987. The transcript was

15

filed in compliance with the Court of Appeal's June 28, 1988

15

Order to Show Cause. Respondent was ordered to pay a sanction of

17

$500 to the Clerk of the Court for filing the transcript late.

18
19

20.

Incorporating by reference the allegations of

20

paragraph 19 above, multiple causes for disciplinary action is

21

established under section 8025(c) of the code in that said

22

conduct constitutes unprofessional conduct; the willful violation

23

of duty; and

gross incompetency in practice.

24
25

21.

Incorporating by reference the allegations of

26

paragraph 19 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action

27

under section 8025(d) of the code in that said conduct

1

constitutes the repeated unexcused failure to transcribe notes o

2

cases pending on appeal and to file the transcripts thereof

3

within the time required by law.

4
5

DATED

:^W^^f

if 10 .

6
7
8
/RICHARD J . BLACK
Executive Officer
Board of C e r t i f i e d S h o r t h a n d R e p o r t e r s
D e p a r t m e n t of Consumer A f f a i r s
S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a

9
10
11

Complainant

12
03587110SF88AD1936

13
14
15
16
17
18

0

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE

NUNEZ, SANTIAGO
vs
YOUNG, HEDVIG, ET AL.
A039760
Marin County No. 121365

BY THE COURT:
TAUNT. BYRD is delinquent in payment of the $500 sanction
imposed in Che above entitled action on August 9, 1988 (copy
attached). Ms. Byrd should pay the sanction or submit a
reasonable schedule of payment for this Court's approval.
The
sanction should be paid or Che schedule submitted by February 15,
1989, otherwise contempt procedures will be initiated, which
could lead to the issuance of a WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT (ARREST).

**•* * "-vf** *•.. ~-" v* "*»•*• zcr •*"" r* /^ , fi , «

«•:** ••*

K
PUTT

Dated

3'M 1 3 &lSa
LOW, PJ.

P. J

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE

IF O L E
NUNEZ,

AUG-01988

SANTIAGO

vs
YOUNG, HEDWIG, ET AL.

HON c. OAnncv

A039760
y.ann County No. 121365

BY THE COURT:
TAUNI BYRD, having f i l e d the transcript in compliance with
t h i s c o u r t ' s Order to Show cause of June 28, 1988, i s hereby
ordered t o pay a sanction of $500., for f i l i n g the transcript
nearly 5 months l a t e . This sanction should be paid to the Clerk
of the Court of^Appeal f on or before September 15, 1988.
The aforementioned Order to Show Cause of June 28, 1988, i s
hereby discharged

D/Y O * .

~u>

-0-ERK

ocpvrr

Dated

AUG

(I

9 S88
K'MG, J.

ACIIHG

p. J

COF
COURT OF APPEAL OP THE STATE 01' CAUI'OKNIA
'IN AND FOR THE
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE

FILED

SANTIAGO NUNEZ, A MINOR
v.
KEDWIG YOUNG, ET AL.
A039760
Marin County No. 121365

JUN2SI988
Court cf App:3l • to App. Dfrf.
K O N D. BARROW

P/
DIPUTY

BY THE COURT:
Tauni Byrd, having been declared not competent to act as an
Official Reporter in the State of California by this Court's
Order of April 13, 1988, (copy attached) is hereby ordered to
appear and show cause before this Court on July 22, 1988, at 9:00
a.m., why sanctions should not be imposed upon her for her
failure to file, in a timely manner, the transcript in the above
entitled case, A copy of the notice of appeal filed August 27,
1987 is attached.
If Ms. Byrd completes and files her transcript with the Marin
County Clerk on or before July 20, 1988, she then need not appear
on July 22, 1988, as ordered above, and the matter will be
submitted for disposition. Should Ms. Byrd not file the
transcript and not appear before this Court on July 22, 1988, she
may be declared in contempt of court and a WARRANT OP ATTACHMENT
(ARREST) may issue, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sections
1212-1216.
This order is made pursuant to the Court's power to control the
conduct, of its ministerial officers. (Code Civ. Proc, section
128, subd. (a) (5); see also, Malick v. Contra Costa Flood Control
Dist. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 50, 52.)
• Xr4 n ~Axaow cum
c« "vr zojtrr y A».»O-.
J» * v- of ».'.u-c-w»« * P «rr A*<»tLL*-i c.-3-»-rr oo

7o „ „ &£V „<?f)
Dated

JUN 2 8 S88

.GJEPIC
OGPVTT

LOW, PJ.

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I declare that on January 13, 1989, I served the attached order
in said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a
sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United
States
mail at San Francisco, California addressed as follows:
Office of the County Clerk, Marin County Superior Court, Hall of
Justice, Civic Center, Post Office Box E, San Rafael, California
94903
Tauni Byrd, 798 E. 7440 So. #20, Midvale, Utah 84047
Tauni Bvrd, Ih. Dixon Hindley, Clerk, 240 East 400 South, P.O.
Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Division of Registration, P.O. Box 5802, 160 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84110
Donald Jones, President. Utah Shorthans Reporters Association,
2223 East 1300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Ronald W. Gibson, Deputy, Administrative Office of th Courts of
the State of Utah, 230 South 500 East, 0300, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102
Howard Hanson, Court Administrator, Hall of Justice, 3ox E,
Civic Center, San Rafael, California 94903
Richard Black, Executive Director, Certified Shorthand Reporters
Board, 1020 "N" Street, Sacramento, California 95814

Jim Campbell
Deputy Clerk

JOAN C. WATT, #3967
RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, #5292
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: 53 2-5444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Case No. CR86-887
Supreme Court No. 880161
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO

:

)
) ss:
)

I, RICK BLACK, declare under penalty of perjury that the
following is true and correct:'
1. I am the Executive Officer of the California Certified
Shorthand Reporters Board.
2. The California Certified Shorthand Reporters Board is
the licensing agency of Certified Shorthand Reporters in the State
of California and is located at 1021 "O" Street, Room A-153,
Sacramento, California 95814, telephone (916) 445-5101.

3.

As Executive Officer, I am familiar with the record

keeping system of the California Certified Shorthand Reporters
Board and am able to research the records to determine the license
status of Certified Shorthand Reporters in the State of California.
4.

I am acquainted with the license file of Tauni D.

Lee, aka Tauni D. Byrd.

Ms. Lee was originally licensed as a

Certified Shorthand Reporter in California by having been assigned
license number 6770 in July, 1985.
5.

Ms. Lee currently has no legal ability to act as an

official court reporter in the state of California because:

a. On April 13, 1988, the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Room 5154,
San Francisco, California, 94102, telephone (415)5579850, issued an order declaring Ms. Lee "incompetent to
act" as an official court reporter in any court in the
state of California. The order has not been vacated, and
thus Ms. Lee has not had legal authority to act as a
reporter in any court of California since the order was
issued on April 13, 1988.
and
b. As a result of Ms. Lee's failure to pay her
license renewal fees, her license became "delinquent" on
April 30, 1990.
6.

Richard

J.

Black,

Executive

Officer

for

the

Certified Shorthand Reporters Board of the State of California, has
initiated proceedings to revoke Ms. Leefs license by serving an
Accusation on Ms. Lee to revoke her license as a certified
shorthand reporter.

7.

A "default" hearing on the revocation proceedings,

which Ms. Lee did not attend, was held before an Administrative Law
Judge on November 6, 1990.
8.
will

issue

It is anticipated that the administrative law judge
a Proposed

Decision to the California

Certified

Shorthand Reporters Board, and that the Board will adopt, reject,
or modify that decision concerning revocation of Ms. Lee's license.
9.

In the event that Ms. Lee is dissatisfied with the

final decision of the Board, she is entitled to appeal the decision
in the Superior Court.
day of

DATED this

1990.

(l^A^J JWt
RICHARD J. BLACK

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e me t h i s
A / ^ V xr/ Jzjr~s~

day of

, 1990.

NOTARY PUBLIC

DAVIO C. NORZU

mrmPUBLxmjxjmA

>

^'f

sreaapKO oounnr
t*TCC*l*390NaPK?£SAtJG 211991
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Residing in
Sacramento County, California

My Commission Expires:

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 Sate Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, this

day of

, 1990.
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Presiding Judge Scott Daniels
District Judge Raymond Uno
Court Reporter Tauni (Byrd) Lee
StjLte Court Administrator William Vickrey

JUVEN8-E COURT
ADMINISTRATOR

DIFINDANTS
DCHIItT

FROM;/ R<wxGibson
DATE: vMay 17, 1988
RE:

Official Court Reporter Tauni (Byrd) Lee

On May 6, 1988 jfr. Geoff Butler, Supreme Court Clerk,
related to me a conversation he had with Tauni (Byrd) Lee regarding
preparation of the trial transcript in the case'of The State of Utah
vs. Ralph Lerov Menzies. No. 880161, currently before the Supreme
Court on appeal. During the course of the conversation Mr. Butler
indicated that Ms. (Byrd) Lee estimated that it^would require
approximat ely_j_jgn_th3_to ^prepare H:£ejt rigs crip t:, ^ that her_husband
was >eing_.jtransferred_to J£urope„and^that she intended_to_resign her
employment in Utah and join him_in about 2 months.
We noted that the transcript was of a Capital case which has
been identified by the Supreme Court as the number one priority of
the court and mutually expressed our concern- regarding the extensive
tise requested for preparation of the transcript as well as the
complication associated with Ms. (Byrd) Lee leaving the country
prior to the completion of the transcript.
Mr. Butler inquired
whether the Judicial Council rule governing court reporters.permits
placing
a reporter on leave with pay
in order
to permit
concentration on the transcript and thus expedite its preparation.
I informed him that the rule prohibits granting such leave.
On Monday, May 9, 1938, I received a telephone call from 3rd
District Presiding J_udge_jScott J)anieis who expressed his grave
concerns regarding the report edifice"' anticipated for preparation of
the transcript in this case and of the indication that Ms. (Byrd)
Lee was intending to leave the country before its completion. Judge
Daniels requested that we do all that is possible administratively

Chief Justice Hall
May 17, 1988
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to ensure that the transcript is prepared timely and before the
reporter terminates employment in order to avoid any possibility of
jeopordizing the appeal.
Subsequently, I presented the issue to Bill Vickrey who
concurred with the Sentiment of Judge Daniels in recognizing the
urgency and unique nature of the circumstances surrounding this
particular situation. Bill indicated that the preparation of the
transcript must supersede any other consideration.
He suggested
that administrative rules should not interfere with finding a
solution to a problem in a particular case.
On May 12, 1988 I met with Tauni (Byrd) Lee to discuss the
matter. She indicated that an offer to place her on full time leave
with
pay would not alleviate the problem nor contribute to
expediting the preparation of the transcript because of the process
she utilizes for prepartion of all of her transcripts.
As I
understand it, she delivers discs of her notes to a note reader and
typist, who she employees, who in turn prepares the draft transcript
for Ms. Lee to proof read and correct. The note reader is employed
part time in a law firm and is available to work on the transcript
only every other week. Ms. Lee indicates that she can only proceed
at the speed of the note reader and that no other options are
available.
In response to my request for a plan to reduce the time of
preparation of the transcript, Ms. Lee estimates^_that^ it,_will
£oi^i_st;„oX_approximately 5,000 pages, and that if she could devote
full time every other week to proof reading and correcting the draft
on alternating weeks when the note reader would prepare the draft
that they could produce a maximum of 625 pa,ges-~each week and thus
have the full transcript filed by July 23. 1988. She also stated
that her husband's reassignment had been postponed and she was not
planning to move for six months. This plan would result in reducing
the time required to prepare the transcript from the original
estimate of 9 months to 3 months.
Although the placing of a court reporter onJLeave with pay
status foT the~purpose of transcript preparation is prohibited by
the Judicial^nTolihcil^Rule^~Y~ fee,! compelled to do so in tEHF
instance.„ With reluctance" at violating a'"Judicial CounciT"Eule T
have approved placing__MsJt__Lee
on leave with pay for the weeks
beginning on May 23rd, June 6th, June 20th~July 4th, and July 15th
conditioned upon the assurances thac the schedule will be met. I do
so due to the urgency and uniqueness of the circumstances as well as
the nature of this particular case which justifies treating the
matter as an exception to the rule. It is not intended to establish
a presidence for other cases.

Chief Justice Hall
May 17, 1988
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This problem is recurring and increasingly frustrating to
resolve. It is indicative of the numerous problems confronting
judges and administrators in attempting to manage the system. J&e
concept of the Judicial Council—rule - is -sound -and is -designed to
avoid doubJje^.CPjnpgnsatiQn_of->j:eporter3 .by payment .of „a_state_salary
during periods when the reporter, is preparing^a_transcript_forjrtiich
JL separAte_j^e is_also—.charged.
Nevertheless, the * competing
interests of court duties, transcript preparation and private
outside depositions continues. Examples of related problems are
obtaining the cooperation of some reporters in accepting assignments
to other courts when the need arises and in allowing their outside
work to interfere with court responsibilities. The ability to
regulate the system is unfortunately compromised by our drastic
reduction in applicants for reporter positions demonstrated by some
present vacancies which we cannot fill. Although many reporters are
dedicated
professionals
who
commit
themselves
to
their
responsibilities, the problems persist. I am hopeful that the
Judicial Council's Task force on the court reporting system can
develop some proposed solutions to avoid interruption of the courts'
business because of these issues.
0426R
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mivb luMciai ^istrtri OJouri
RAYMOND S. UNO. JUDGE
COURT BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111

August 29, 1988
Ms. Tauni Lee
O f f i c i a l Shorthand Reporter
M e t r o p o l i t a n Hall of J u s t i c e
240 East 400 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Dear T a u n i :
Sever£l_J^
that
have i n c r e a s e d the concern surrounding your a b i l i t y to complete
t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e t r a n s c r i p t in t h e a p p e a l of State v.
Menzies in a timely manner.
U n d e r t h e e x i s t i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h y o u , you have been
r e l i e v e d of your o f f i c i a l d u t i e s as the r e p o r t e r for Judge Uno on
a l t e r n a t e weeks, but allowed to r e c e i v e f u l l pay so t h a t you may
d e v o t e more u n i n t e r r u p t e d t i m e t o t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e
transcript.
However, you have chosen not to p r e s e n t yourself a t
t h e c o u r t h o u s e for work on the t r a n s c r i p t so t h a t supervision by
your judge and c o u r t e x e c u t i v e has become i m p o s s i b l e .
Moreover,
your f r e q u e n t absences during those a l t e r n a t e weeks when you are
a s s i g n e d t o p e r f o r m y o u r o f f i c i a l d u t i e s has become an
u n a c c e p t a b l e burden upon your i u d q e , fellow c o u r t r e D o r t e r s . and
the court executive.
T h e r e f o r e , e f f e c t i v e immediately, we a r e r e l i e v i n g you of
y o u r a s s i g n m e n t t o Judge Uno u n t i l t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t h e
t r a n s c r i p t in S t a t e v . Menzies.
You w i l l continue to receive
f u l l pay,
You a r e d i r e c t e d t o a p p e a r a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e
_Off ic_e_o.f.. the^Co.gjiLsL^ 300^J3l£t<^^
n
August 3 0.~.be-tween—t h e - hour-S--o£~~84-0~0L_a ^m.., aad~3:.0 0Up*jiL*,_ and
t h e r e a f t e r _ _ u n t i l . . t h e completion, o f „ t h , e _ J : r a n s c r i p t .
You are to
work e x c l u s i v e l y on the ^ t r a n s c r i p t unde^-Hi^he^dir^c.fer^supe^y.ision.
o*=:Sorn?ta&frbsjon-.
You a r e d i r e c t e d t o p r e s e n t for Mr. Gibson's
i n s p e c t i o n t h a t p o r t i o n of tne t r a n s c r i p t t h a t has been prepared
t o d a t e . Ycu a r e to present: to Mr. Gibson on a weekly basis t h a t
p o r t i o n of cne t r a n s c r i p t prepared during t h a t week.
Sincerely,
Raynfond S. Urto^
District Court Judge

Timothy'M. Shea
Trial Court Executive
Tnird Judicial District Cour

STATE OF UTAH

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS
230 SOUTH 500 EAST. SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84102
(801)533-6371

GORDON R. HALL

RONALD W. GIBSON

CHIEF JUSTICE

DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR

CHAIRMAN. JUDK3AL COUNCIL

JOHN F. MCNAMARA

WILLIAM C. VICKREY

JUVENILE COURT

STATE COURT AOMiNlSTRATOR

TO:

William

MEMORANDUM-

AOMiNlSTRATOR

Vickrey
* DEFENDANT'S

FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Rotial

Gibson

I

EXHIBIT

Tauni Lee, O f f i c i a l Shorthand Reporter
August 30, 1988

On Tuesday, August 30, 1988, I met with Tauni Lee "in my
office pursuant to the letter of August 29, 1988, signed by Judge
Raymond Uno and Court Executive, Timothy Shea (copy attached). At
that time I provided Mrs. Lee with a copy of the letter and reviewed
its contents with her.
I informed Mrs. Lee of the discussions I had during the week
of August 22nd with Presiding Judge Scott Daniels, Judge Raymond Uno/
and Timothy Shea regarding Mrs. Lee's poor job performance. Those
complaints included repeated tardiness and absences from work,
confrontations with other reporters and court clerks leading to
morale problems within the court and a violation of the security
policy by providing key and card allowing access to the secure
parking area and the building to her husband.
I confirmed with Mrs. Lee that portion of the letter which
relieves her of her assignment to Judge Uno. We also reviewed the
directives contained in the letter regarding her appearance in this
office daily until completion of transcripts due to the Supreme
• Court and the inspection of the progress in preparation of those
transcripts.
Mrs. Lee informed me that the State v. Menzies transcript
was nearing completion and gave me her assurance that it, together
with the State v. Wjnsr.ess transcript, would be filed with the
Supreme Court on or before September 6, 1988. She further informed
me that the transcripts are prepared on her computer which is
situated ir^ her^iogre^7gid7^'th'at''"transporting' it jto_this_office*~would
be cumbersome, time consuming, and serve no purpose in view of the
limited time remaining for their completion.

Mrs. Tauni Lee
August 30, 1988
Page 2

Mrs. Lee also indicated that,she has had_axailable two .weeks.jii_Jlg£X£^ur^
^ judicial
£onferences of which time she believes two days should be credited
toward her, annual leave. She also was absent August 25th and 26th
and 29th on annual leave. In addition, she_^lans^jto-^*travel^*to
California on September_9L-.thru.l,6f 1988
It is my judgment, and I so indicated to Mrs. Lee, that
because there only remains three working days (excluding Labor day,
today and Tuesday the 6th) involved it is unreasonable to require
her to appear daily in this office and relocate her computer for
that short period, ^authorized her to continue preparation of the
transcripts at her home^^and^report to this office on Tuesday,
September "6," 1988J ^folj^ving_ the tfilliig^Sr^the -transcripts or her
appearanceJ^i.ox£-th£L^UB«me^ojurjE7 At ~thaV~meeting, I will inform
hereof her employment status after~consultation with Judge Daniels,
Judge Uno, Tim Shea and yourself.
IP
cc: Judge Scott Daniels
Judge Raymond Uno
Timothy Shea

Tauni Lee
0473R
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tHljirtr aiubtetal district Court
DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT

RAYMOND S. UNO, JUDGE
COURT BUI'-DING
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111

8553221
September 7, 1988

Ms. Tauni Lee
Official Shorthand Reporter
Metropolitan Hall of Justice
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Dear Tauni :

E f f e c t i v e i m m e d i a t e l y , you are terminated from employment
with the T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t .
As you a r e now under t h e
s u p e r v i s i o n of Mr. Ron Gibson, you are to provide to Mr. Gibson
a l l c o u r t h o u s e keys and your magnetic parking card immediately.
You may use today and Thursday to remove any personal items from
your o f f i c e .
P r i n c i p a l among t h e grounds for t h i s termination is your
h a b i t u a l t a r d i n e s s and absenteeism. Records show that since May
198 8 you have been a b s e n t , considerably more than any,.,o.thec—.court
jepor ter .
T h i s has become an u n a c c e p t a b l e burden upon your
j u d g e , f e l l o w court r e p o r t e r s , and the c o u r t e x e c u t i v e .
Also,
the u n p r o f e s s i o n a l manner in which you c o n d u c t y o u r s e l f i s a
m a t t e r of concern.
Your a t t i t u d e towards judges and staff
has
become i n d i f f e r e n t .
You have been slow ..to.-giihmifc t r a n s n r i p*"*,
y e t demand a c c e l e r a t e d payment by the county.
In one incident
you refused to answer a c a l l to court although you were in your
office.
F i n a l l y , l o a n i n g your m a g n e t i c p a r k i n g card to an
u n a u t h o r i z e d person was a breach of s e c u r i t y , and your reaction
to the c l e r k who reported the incident was i n a p p r o p r i a t e . Such
conduct is not f i t t i n g of an o f f i c e r of the c o u r t .
Sincerely,
Raymond S. Uno
Third District Judge

TMS:jsh

cc:

Honorable Gordon R. Hall
Ron Gibson
/

Timothy M. Shea
Trial Court Executive
Third Judicial District
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POINT III. UTAH'S DEATH PENALTY SCHEME
OUTLINED IN UTAH CODE ANN. 5 76-3-2 07 FAILS
TO MEET CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS. . . . . ,
A. THE STATUTE IMPERMISSIBLY ALLOWS
UNLIMITED EVIDENCE IN AGGRAVATION. . . .
B. THE STATUTE UNACCEPTABLY REDUCES
EVIDENTIARY BURDENS FOR THE STATE'S
INTRODUCTION OF AGGRAVATION EVIDENCE. . .
C. THE STATUTE ILLEGITIMATELY CREATES A
PRESUMPTION FOR DEATH IN ITS LANGUAGE
AND VERDICT FORMS
D. THE STATUTE ILLICITLY SHIFTS THE
BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT AT THE
SENTENCING PHASE OF THE CAPITAL TRIAL. .
E. THE STATUTE FAILS TO PROVIDE FOR
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POINT IV. THE DEATH QUALIFICATION OF JURORS
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QUALIFICATION UNDER THE FEDERAL
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Witherspoon v. Illinois
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Griasby v. Mabry I . . ,
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Griasby v. Mabry II

4.

Lockhart v. McCree . . ,

• •

.,

B. A REVIEW OF DEATH QUALIFICATION AS
DISCUSSED IN UTAH CASE LAW
,
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C. UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
HISTORY
1.

Article I. 5 10

2.

Article I. 5 12

POINT V. THE ADMISSION OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE
ILLEGALLY SEIZED FROM MR. MENZIES' RESIDENCE
VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES AND ARTICLE I. 5 14 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
A. THE SEARCH CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY THE
CONSENT GIVEN BY NICOLE ARNOLD.
1. If the consent were valid, the
search exceeded the scope of that
consent.
2. The detectives could not evade
the protections of the fourth
amendment by inducing private
parties to help in the search. . . .
B. THE PREVIOUS SEARCH CANNOT BE
SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSEQUENT CONSENT OF
MR. MENZIES
C. THE SEARCH CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY THE
SEARCH WARRANT AS ISSUED AND EXECUTED.
1. The circuit court magistrate
erred in issuing a warrant to search
Mr. Menzies' home because the search
warrant affidavit was insufficient
to establish probable cause for the
search
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2. All evidence seized pursuant to
the search warrant must be suppressed
since the warrant was acquired in bad
faith.
3. Even if this Court finds no fault
in the probable cause determination,
the search of Mr. Menzies' residence
pursuant to the warrant fails because
of the prior, illegal confirmatory
search.
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY
SEIZED WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO REMOVE FOR CAUSE FIVE
JURORS WHOSE EXPRESSED BIAS PREVENTED THEM
FROM ACTING IMPARTIALLY AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
A.

JUROR TAYLOR

B.

JUROR CANNON

C.

JUROR MORGAN

D.

JUROR HARSH

E.

JUROR PETERSON

POINT VII. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT ADMITTED HEARSAY
STATEMENTS OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER INTO EVIDENCE
AT TRIAL.
A. HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER
CONCERNING HER STATE OF MIND WERE
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL
1. Maureen Hunsaker's state of mind
is not relevant to any issue in this
case.

2. The admission of hearsay evidence
of Maureen Hunsaker's state of mind
was unfairly prejudicial to
Mr. Menzies.
B. HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF MAUREEN
HUNSAKER CONCERNING PRESENT SENSE
IMPRESSIONS WERE IMPROPERLY ADMITTED AT
TRIAL
1. Hearsay statements concerning
kidnapping should have been excluded.
2. Hearsay statements concerning
robbery should have been excluded. .
C. THE IMPROPERLY ADMITTED STATEMENTS
GAVE RISE TO PREJUDICIAL ERROR. . . . . .
POINT VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
INTO EVIDENCE A PHOTOGRAPH OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER
WHICH WAS TAKEN SEVERAL YEARS PRIOR TO THE
HOMICIDE.
POINT IX. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLOWING THE PRELIMINARY
HEARING TESTIMONY OF WALTER BRITTON TO BE
READ INTO EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.
A.

CONFRONTATION
1.

Unavailability

2.

Reliability

. .

. .

a.

Jailhouse Informant

....

b.

Mental Incompetency

....

c.

Rule 35 Hearing

d.

Inadeguate Cross-examination

B.

RULE 403

C.

PREJUDICE

POINT X. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUASHING
DEFENDANT'S SUBPOENA OF PROSECUTOR.
POINT XI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR MISTRIAL AFTER THE STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE
TO THE DEFENSE THAT THE STATE'S KEY WITNESS
MADE A STATEMENT IDENTIFYING APPELLANT AFTER
THE LINEUP.
A. THE STATE VIOLATED RULE 16, UTAH RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
B. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THIS
EVIDENCE VIOLATES FEDERAL DUE PROCESS. .
POINT XII. THE STATE VIOLATED MR. MENZIES' DUE
PROCESS AND STATUTORY RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY IN
FAILING TO INFORM DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT TIM
LARABEE HAD DIFFICULTY IN SELECTING
MR. MENZIES FROM THE PHOTO ARRAY.
POINT XIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
INTO EVIDENCE AN UNSIGNED SOCIAL SECURITY CARD
BEARING THE NAME OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER.
....
A. THE SOCIAL SECURITY CARD WAS
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY
B. THE CARD WAS IRRELEVANT AND
INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE
C. THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF THE CARD
SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED ANY MINIMAL
PROBATIVE VALUE
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POINT XIV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL WHEN EVIDENCE OF
MR. MENZIES7 PAROLE STATUS REACHED THE JURY
THROUGH A STATE WITNESS IN VIOLATION OF AN
EXPRESS COURT ORDER. . . .
A. TESTIMONY REGARDING MENZIES7
CRIMINAL HISTORY WAS INADMISSIBLE.
B. THE PROSECUTION TEAM COMMITTED
MISCONDUCT. .
1. Deliberate injection of
inadmissible evidence by one of the
State7s chief witnesses qualifies as
prosecutorial misconduct.
2. The detective7s statement
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.
C.

PREJUDICE

D. MENZIES7 STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED.
1.

Impartial Jury

2.

Due Process and Fair Trial

3.

Right to Confrontation . .

...
..

4. The trial court violated
Mr. Menzies7 right to take the stand,
E. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MR. MENZIES7
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
BY NEITHER GRANTING A MISTRIAL NOR
CAUTIONING THE JURY AFTER THE JURY HEARD
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL AND INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF MR. MENZIES7 PAST CRIMINAL
HISTORY

1. The trial court violated
Mr. Menzies7 right to an untainted
jury.
2. The trial court violated
Mr. Menzies' state and federal
constitutional rights to a fair
trial.
3. The trial court deprived
Mr. Menzies of his right to
confrontation.
4. The trial court violated
Mr. Menzies7 right to take the stand.
POINT XV. APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL
BY A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY.
A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

B.

ARGUMENT

POINT XVI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
ADMITTED SEVERAL ITEMS OF "REAL" EVIDENCE. . .
A. HANDCUFFS, HANCUFF BOX AND NICKED
TREE THEORY
B. HOUSEHOLD ITEMS—APPLIANCE CORD,
THREE PIECES OF ROPE
C.

TENNIS SHOES

D.

TEN-CODE

E.

JOGGING JACKET

F.

MENZIES' JACKET

G.

TROY DENTER'S CAR

POINT XVII. CUMULATIVE ERRORS OCCURRING IN
THE GUILT/INNOCENCE PHASE OF THIS TRIAL DENIED
MR. MENZIES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A
FAIR TRIAL.
POINT XVIII. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT.
A. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE EVERY NECESSARY
ELEMENT OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT. . . .
1. The evidence was insufficient to
establish that Mr. Menzies illegally
took or detained Ms. Hunsaker. . . .
2. The evidence was insufficient to
prove that Mr. Menzies illegally took
or detained Ms. Hunsaker against her
will with intent to engage in
felonious behavior.
3. The evidence is insufficient to
prove Mr. Menzies illegally took or
restrained Ms. Hunsaker against her
will with intent to harm her. . . .
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE EVERY ELEMENT OF
ROBBERY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. . . .
C. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
LINKING MR. MENZIES TO THIS CRIME. . . .
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POINT XIX. THE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
FEDERAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND AGAINST
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND VIOLATED
UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING PHOTOGRAPHS
OF MS. HUNSAKER'S CORPSE.
A. THE COURT ADMITTED STATE'S EXHIBITS
6 AND 7 OVER OBJECTION BY APPELLANT. .
B. THE ADMISSION OF THESE PHOTOGRAPHS
VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 AND
APPELLANT'S FEDERAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS
AND AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
1. The photographs had no probative
value.
2. The photographs were unfairly
prejudicial.
3. The fact that the photographs
were admitted during the penalty
phase, which was tried to the bench,
does not dissipate the harm caused
by the improper admission of the
photographs.
C. THE ADMISSION OF THESE UNFAIRLY
PREJUDICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS VIOLATED
APPELLANT'S FEDERAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS
AND AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S FEDERAL RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS AND TO BE FREE FROM CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND WAS PREJUDICIAL
ERROR

POINT XX• THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
MR. MENZIES' PRISON RECORDS SINCE MR. MENZIES7
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF A
CRIMINAL CHARGE WERE NOT PROTECTED IN COMPILING
SUCH RECORDS.
A.

INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . .

1. During the penalty phase, the
State submitted Appellant's prison
records over objection.
2. The prison records contain
numerous allegations from numerous
declarants of crimes for which
Appellant has not been convicted
and of other bad acts allegedly
committed by Appellant.
....
B. STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS APPLYING IN
PRISON ADMINISTRATION DEMONSTRATE THAT
PRISON RECORDS SHOULD NOT BE ADMISSIBLE
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. . . . . . . . .
1. Different state interests govern
prisons and criminal prosecutions,
resulting in different standards of
due process.
2. Due process is frequently
inapplicable in prison administration,
3. The standards of due process that
do not apply in prison administration
fall far below the standards reguired
in a criminal trial. . . . . . . . .

POINT XXI. THE ADMISSION OF THE PRISON RECORDS
VIOLATED THE HEARSAY RULE. WHICH. BY VIRTUE OF
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND AGAINST
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. MUST APPLY TO THE
PENALTY PHASE OF A CAPTIAL SENTENCING
PROCEEDING.
'
A. THE PRISON RECORDS WERE ADMITTED IN
VIOLATION OF THE HEARSAY RULE
B. DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF THE HEARSAY
RULE TO THE PENALTY PHASE OF A CAPITAL
TRIAL
C. THE ADMISSION OF THE HEARSAY
STATEMENTS IN THE PRISON FILES WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR

Page
POINT XXII. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON RECORDS
VIOLATED MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION.
A. THE STATE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION DURING THE PENAIT\
PHASE OF A CAPITAL CASE.
B. THE ADMISSION OF THE PRISON RECORDS
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION PROVIDED BY ARTICLE I,
§ 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
1. The prosecution made no shoving
that any of the prison record
declarants were unavailable. . . . .
2. The hearsay statements included
in the prison record were not
proven reliable.

POINT XXIII. ADMISSION OF THE ENTIRE PRISON
RECORD VIOLATED MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
A. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES A
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION DURING THE PENALTY
PHASE OF A CAPITAL CASE
B. THE ADMISSION THE PRISON RECORDS
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION PROVIDED BY THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION

POINT XXIV. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT VIOLATED
APPELLANT'S FEDERAL AND STATE RIGHTS TO DUE
PROCESS AND AGAINST CRUEL. UNUSUAL AND UNDULY
RIGOROUS PUNISHMENT AND ALSO VIOLATED
ARTICLE I. S 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITTUTION. . .
A. DURING THE PENALTY PHASE OF
APPELLANT'S TRIAL, THE STATE ADMITTED
EVIDENCE OF UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL
CONDUCT OVER OBJECTION
B. THE ADMISSION OF THIS EVIDENCE
VIOLATED THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
AS EXPLAINED IN STATE V. LAFFERTY.
C. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF
UNADJUDICATED CRIMES VIOLATED
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH,
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING UNADJUDICATED
CRIMINAL CONDUCT AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR
VIOLATED UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207;
ARTICLE I, § 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION;
AND STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AGAINST CRUEL, UNUSUAL AND
UNNECESSARILY RIGOROUS PUNISHMENT. . . .

POINT XXV. IN RELYING ON NUMEROUS CLINICAL
EVALUATIONS OF APPELLANT, WHICH WERE
CONDUCTED WHILE APPELLANT WAS IN CUSTODY, THE
COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
POINT XXVI. THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF PENALTY PHASE
WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS TO FEDERAL DUE PROCESS AND TO NOTICE
UNDER ARTICLE I. S3 7 AND 12 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION AND UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 16.
,
A. THE RECORD RELATING TO NOTICE IN THE
PENALTY PHASE IS INCOMPLETE BUT DOES
INDICATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED
EVIDENCE IN THE PENALTY PHASE, OVER
OBJECTION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, RELATING
TO LACK OF NOTICE OF THE EVIDENCE. . . .
1. The prosecution was under a
duty to disclose police reports,
written and recorded statements of
Appellant, criminal record of
Appellant, and penalty phase
witnesses.
2. Defense counsel repeatedly
objected to the prosecution's failure
to fulfill its obligations to disclose
evidence referred to in the discovery
request and court order.
3. The State presented numerous
witnesses and much evidence in
violation of the discovery request
and court order for a witness list.
B. IN ADMITTING THIS EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION
OF APPELLANT'S DISCOVERY REQUEST AND THE
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER TO DISCLOSE PENALTY
PHASE WITNESSES, THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED
APPELLANT'S FEDERAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RIGHTS TO NOTICE DURING THE PENALTY PHASE.

1. Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16
2.

Federal Due Process

. . . . . .

C. RIGHT TO NOTICE UNDER THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION . . . .
POINT XXVII. THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON VICTIM
IMPACT EVIDENCE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S FEDERAL
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AGAINST CRUEL. UNUSUAL AND UNNECESSARILY
RIGOROUS PUNISHMENT.
A. THE COURT IN THIS CASE IMPROPERLY
ADMITTED VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN
SENTENCING APPELLANT TO DEATH
B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS THE CONSIDERATION
OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES. .
C. THE ADMISSION OF THE VICTIM IMPACT
EVIDENCE VIOLATED ARTICLE I, § 9 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE VICTIM IMPACT
EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL

POINT XXVIII. IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL ACTS. THE TRIAL COURT
VIOLATED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
GOVERNING THOSE ACTS AND APPELLANT'S RIGHTS
TO DUE PROCESS.
POINT XXIX. THE ERRORS COMMITTED DURING THE
PENALTY PHASE WERE PREJUDICIAL AND REQUIRE
REVERSAL OF APPELLANT'S DEATH SENTENCE. . .

POINT XXX. THE ADMISSION OF THE EXPERT OPINION
OF DR. PATRICIA SMITH DURING THE PENALTY PHASE
OF MR. MENZIES7 TRIAL. WHICH OPINION WAS IN
PART BASED ON UNRELIABLE INFORMATION. VIOLATED
MR. MENZIES7 RIGHTS UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
AND ARTICLE 1.5 9.
POINT XXXI. MR. MENZIES7 DEATH SENTENCE MUST
BE REVERSED BECAUSE IMPROPER AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES WERE PRESENTED TO AND RELIED ON
BY THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
A. STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
MUST BE CHARGED AND FOUND IN THE GUILT/
INNOCENCE PHASE OR THEY CANNOT BE
INTRODUCED IN THE PENALTY PHASE HEARING.
B. SUBSECTIONS (f), (i) AND (q) WERE
IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE AND REQUIRE THAT THE DEATH SENTENCE
BE VACATED. . . .
. . . . . . . .
1.

Subsection ff)
Subsection (i)

3.

Subsection (q)

..

C. THE ERRONEOUS INTRODUCTION OF
SUBSECTIONS (f), (i) AND (q) INTO THE
SENTENCING DETERMINATION OF THE PENALTY
PHASE DEMANDS REVERSAL OF THE DEATH
SENTENCE ORDERED TO BE IMPOSED ON
MR. MENZIES

Page
POINT XXXII. MR. MENZIES' SENTENCE SHOULD BE
REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY
APPLIED THE WOOD STANDARD.
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE EVIDENCE IN AGGRAVATION OUTWEIGHED
EVIDENCE IN MITGATION BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT
1. The trial court's finding was
induced by an erroneous view of the
law,
.
2. The trial court's finding was
without adequate evidentiary support.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
DEATH IS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY
1. The trial court's finding was
induced by an erroneous view of the
law.
2. The trial court's finding was
without adequate and reliable
support.
CJONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

ADDENDUM N

1

3-.-fl&y~

DURING THE COURSE OF THSES 15-MINUTE BREAK.

4 te

2

WE WILL RESUME AGAIN IN 15 MINUTES.

3

(RECESS.)

4

?HE COURT:

OKAY.

6A>H^

OUR REGULAR REPORTER RAN ^

5

INTO A LITTLE DIFFICULTY,AND CAN'T MAKE IT BACK, SO WE HAVE

6

A SUBSTITUTE, MR. CARLTON,WAY, WHO IS JUDGE RIGTRUP'SM?~

7

REPORTER WHO HAS GRACIOUSLY CONSENTED TO ASSIST US IN OUR

8

TIME OF DIRE NEED.

9

fit**

THE JURORS HAVE BEEN SELECTED WHO HAVE BEEN tM

10

REVIEWED AND CHALLENGES MADE.

11

THAT I READ WILL BE THOSE WHO WILL REMAIN HERE, AND WILL

12

SERVE ON THE JURY PANEL.

13

CALLED MAY BE EXCUSED.

14

AND SO THE NAMES OF THOSE /

AND THOSE WHOSE NAMES ARE NOT

AND AT THIS TIME, ON BEHALF Or THE STAT 7. OF

15

UTAH, THE PLAINTIFF, AND THE DEFENDANT AND THIS COURT, *

16

WOULD LIKE TO THANK THOSE WHO ARE NOT SELECTED FOR SERVING

17

ON THIM JURY UP UNTIL THIS PARTICULAR TIME.

18

IN THE PROCESS THAT YOU HAVE LEARNED SOMETHING ABOUT THE

19

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE NEED TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN

20

TERMS OF SELECTING JUROR.'J FOH Till

21

.

AND HOPEFULLY,

PARTICULAR CASE.

IF YOU ARE NOT SELECTED ON THIS JURY PANEL

22

THIS TIME, HOPEFULLY YOU WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE

23

SELECTED ON ANOTHER CASE, BUT HOPEFULLY THE PROCESS WILL BE

24

NOT AS LONG SO THAT YOU WILL NOT BE WORN OUT BY THE TIME

25

THAT YOU GET TO SERVE ON THE JURY.
888

1

BUT AS YOU PROBABLY REALIZE, THE CHANGES OF

2

SERVING ON A JURY ARE VERY SLIM, SO YOU MAY NOT BE CALLED,

3

AND IF YOU ARE CALLED, YOU STILL MAY NOT BE SELECTED TO

4

SERVE ON A JURY TO TRY A CASE.

5

SO IF YOU DO HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE,

6

I'M SURE THAT IT WILL BE OF MUCH EDUCATIONAL^VALUE, BOTH TO

7

YOURSELF AND TO THE COURT.

8
9

SO I WILL READ THIS LIST, AND THOSE WHOSE
NAMES ARE NOT CALLED MAY BE EXCUSED.

10

TO RETURN AGAIN.

11

LIKE TO HAVE YOU REMAIN.
T2.VCKL-

12

MR. JONES:

AND YOU DO NOT HAVE

THOSE WHOSE NAMES ARE CALLED, I WOULD
YOU WILL BE SWORN.
COULD WE HAVE THE JURORS STAND AS

13

THEIR NAMES ARE CALLED SO THAT WE ARE SURE IT CORRESPONDS

14

WITH THE LIST.

15

THE COURT:

16

FRANK WALTER OUIMETTE.

17

RONALD CURTIS HICKS.

18

JAMES L. HAMPSHIRE.

19

HELENS D. GASS.

20
21

FIRST CASE —

FIRST JUROR IS

NEXT IS LARRY TAYLOR.

NEXT IS

NEXT IS SANDRA J. STROUD.
NEXT IS JACK MARTIN WALL.

NEXT IS
NEXT IS

NEXT IS ROBERT FRANK ARCHULETTA.—

MS. WELLS:

JUDGE, I BELIEVE YOU HAVE MISSED

THE COURT:

DID I MISS ONE, 3 3?

ONE.

22

MYRNA

23

MATULEVICH.

24

NEXT IS KATHLEEN WINN. NEXT IS NATHAN
LV.UW (r
WILLIAM ADAMS. NEXT IS LILLIAN,, EATON. NEXT IS KATHY F.
889

25

AND LET ME SEE.

OKAY.

WHERE DID I GET TO?

1

ROSENKRANTZ.

NEXT IS LINDA L. SANDSTROM.

THAT-IS IT

'?
2

y*

THERE •

3
4

MS-r^WEiLS:

/

>

*

YES, YOUR HONOR, AS—WELL—AS

T H A T - " T H E J URORS—THAT-Y-OU-H-A-VE-SE-LEeT^a^

'

-

,

•

^-:'-r
"^ * >

5

MR-r—JONES:

YES, IT IS.

-r^/.\-

6

THE COURT:

I GUESS IT'S PROPER AT THIS TIME,

7

THEN, THAT THE OTHERS BE EXCUSED, AND THEN WE CAN HAVE THE

8

JURORS SWORN.

9

VERY MUCH FOR BEIJNG_HERE_KITH.-US

10

SO ALL THE OTHERS, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU

/ ( T H E OTHER JURORS LEAVE THE ROOM.) __,.) -~-^

11

THE COURT:

THE^'BATLIFF

WILL SEAT YOU SO THAT

12

WHEN YOU COME BACK, YOU MUST REMAIN IN THOSE SEATS ALL THE

13

TIME SO THAT THE ATTORNEYS WILL KNOW WHO YOU ARE.

14

IF YOU WI-iL STAND AND BE SWORN.

15

(JURY SWORN.)

16

THE COURT:

AT THIS TIME, WE WILL EXCUSE YOU

17

AND TOMORROW MORNING WE WILL PROCEED WITH THE OPENING

18

STATEMENTS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EVIDENCE.

19
20

I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN RESUME AT 10:00

TOMORROW MORNING, IS THAT CORRECT, OR CAN WE START AT 9:30?

21

MS. WELLS:

YOUR HONOR, I HAVE A CONFLICT IN

22

ANOTHER COURT AT* 9:30, AND I DON'T KNOW WHEN THAT WILL BE

23

FINISHED.

24
25

.

THE COURT:
THEN.

WE—WXLL HAVE TO START AT 10:00,

SO TOMORROW MORNING AT 10:00 O'CLOCK, IF YOU CAN BE
890

1 I HERE BEFORE THAT TIME SO THAT WE CAN RESUME ON TIME, WE
U-cL ''
2 I WILL START WITH THE OPENING STATEMENTS, AND THEN WE WILL
3

PROCEED AS I INDICATED WHEN I WAS EXPLAINING TO YOU THE

4

PROCEDURES THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW.

5
6

IS THERE ANY OTHER MATTERS THAT WE SHOULD
HANDLE AT THIS TIMEZ

„

7

MK. JOKES-:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

8

THE COURT:

IF NOT, I JUST WANT TO ADMONISH

9

YOU, AGAIN, THAT YOU ARE NOT TO TALK WITH ANY ONE REGARDING

10

THIS CASE, FAMILY MEMBERS, RELATIVES OR NEIGHBORS OR ANYONE

11

ELSE.

12

IF ANYONE SHOULD APPROACH YOU, TELL THEM THAT

13

YOU ARE ON JURY DUTY AND YOU CANNOT TALK ABOUT THIS CASE.

14

IF THEY SHOULD PERSIST, WALK AWAY AND REPORT THAT TO THE

15

COURT, AND PLEASE DO NOT EXPOSE YOURSELF TO ANY PUBLICITY

16

FROM TELEVISION, RADIO, NEWSPAPERS OR ANYTHING ELSE.

17

THAT UNDERSTOOD?

18
19

IF THERE IS NONE —

THE RECORD SHOULD SHOW NO ONE HAS RAISED
THEIR HAND.

SO YOU MAY BE EXCUSED FOR THIS EVENING.

22

(JURY IS EXCUSED.)

23

MS-r—WBtLS:

24

YOUR HONOR, WE NEED FOR THE

BENEFIT OF THE RECORD THE JURY —

A
25

IF THERE IS ANYONE THAT

DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND.

20
21

IS

YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD JUST

'

LIKE THE RECORD TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE NOT WAIVING OUR
891

1

CAUSE CHALLENGES THAT WE PREVIOUSLY MADE TO JURORS UPON

2

WHICH WE DID NOT EXERCISE OUR PRE-EMPTORY CHALLENGES.

3

THINK SPECIFICALLY ALTERNATE NUMBER 1, THAT WE DID NOT

4

EXERCISE A PRE-EMPTORY ON THAT.

5

CAUSE.

I

WE DID CHALLENGE FOR

WE ARE NOT WAIVING THAT ON AN APPEAL ISSUE.
BUT THE REASON THAT WE DID NOT DO THAT IS J

6
7

GIVEN THE ENTIRE POOL THAT WE HAD BEFORE US, IT WAS OUR

8

DECISION THAT PERHAPS THERE ARE OTHERS THAT WE SHOULD TAKE

9

OFF GIVEN THEIR ORDER AND THE ENTIRE SITUATION.
WE WOULD ALSO LIKE THE COURT TO NOTE FOR THE

10

—or"

11

RECORD THAT THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT OUR FOUR CAUSE

12

MOTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE JURORS HAS CAUSED US TO

13

EXERCISE ON THOSE SAME JURORS.

14

OF THEM THAT WE BELIEVE WE EXERCISED PRE-EMPTORIES ON THAT

15

WE ORDINARILY WOULD NOT HAVE IF THE COURT HAD GRANTED OUR

16

MOTIONS AND, IN FACT, THE DEFENSE ENDS UP HAVING FOUR PRE-

17

EMPTORY CHALLENGES THAT WE ARE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE IN A

18

CAPITAL CASE.

19

I BELIEVE THERE ARE EIGHT

AND SO WE BELIEVE THAT THE REQUIREMENT 07

20

DOING THAT HAS CREATED AN UNFAIR —

21

WITH US EXERCISING TO-HAVE A"FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY

22

BECAUSE WE ARE LIMITED TO FOUR PRE-EMPTORIES.

HAS CREATED PROBLEMS

23

THE COURT:

THE STATE?

24

MR. JONES:

NO RESPONSE.

25

THE COURT:

OKAY.

IT WILL BE NOTED FOR THE
892

1 I RECORD THOSE OBJECTIONS.
2

O'CLOCK.

OKAY, THEN, TOMORROW AT 10:00

WE WILL RESUME THEN.

WE WILL BE IN RECESS UNTIL

3 I THEN.
4 I

(ADJOURNED UNTIL FEBRUARY 18, 1988.)

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

DEC
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3 1990

I
:. ,uu., Cerk

ORIGINAt""

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case N 0 . 861908871

vs.
RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

Trial Transcrint,
Partial, 2-17-88

Defendant.

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of February,
I988, at 5:°° o'clock p.m., this cause came on for trial
before the HONORABLE RAYMOND UNO, District Court, with a
jury, in the Salt Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City,
Utah.

A P P E A R A N C E S :

For the State:

ERNEST W. JONES
RICHARD G. MAC DOUGALL

For the Defendant

FRANCES M. PALACIOS
BROOKE C. WELLS

1

THE COURT:-

Okay.

2

ran

into a little difficulty.

3

make

4

Way, who is Judge Rigtrup's

5

graciously

6

need.

it back.

She went and

The

to assist

9

of those that

I read

10

here and will

serve on the

LI

whose names are not called

12

this

13

Plaintiff

14

like to thank

15

on this

L6

hopefully,

17

something

18

need to be very

L9

for this particular

made.

may be excused.

those who are not selected
this particular

about the criminal

hopefully,

24

you'll

S5

serve

those
And at

careful

for

serving

time.

And,

learned

justice system

and

in terms of selecting

the

jurors

case.

If you are not selected

23

remain

and this Court, I would

in the p r o c e s s , that you've

opportunity

And

names

of the State of Utah, the

jury up until

22

have

And so, the

jury panel.

and the Defendant

this

(sic)

us in our time of dire

will be those who will

time, on behalf

panel

can't

jurors have been selected, who

been reviewed, and challenges

21

she

able reporter, who has

8

20

reporter

So, we have astute Mr. Carlson

consented

7

Our regular

on this

time, hopefully

you will have an

to be selected

on another case.

the process

jury

But,

will be not as long so that

not be worn out by the time that you get to
on the

jury.

But, as you probably

realize, the

1

chances

of serving

on a jury are very

2

may not be called.

And if you are called, you

3

may not be selected

to serve on a jury to try a case.

4

So, if you do have that opportunity

5

that

6

yourself

it will be of much

So, I'll

8

names

9

have to return again.
I'd

So, you
still

to serve, I'm

are not called

read

this

and value both to

Those whose names

jurors

13

it corresponds

stand as their names

14

whose

with the
THE COURT:

are

called,

You will be sworn.

MR. MACDOUGALL:

12

list, and those

may be excused, and you do not

like to have you remain.

11

Could we have

are called

the

so we are

sure

list?
First case -- first

Walter Ouimette; next

juror is

L5

Frank

16

is Ronald Curtis Hicks; next is Sandra J. Stroud;

17

is James L. Hamshire; next is Jack Martin Wall;

18

is Helen D. Gass; next is Robert

19
10

missed

11

is Bret Larry Taylor; next

Frank

next

next

Archuletta

MR. JONES:

J u d g e , I believe

you've

THE COURT:

Did

33.

—

one.

22

Myrna Matulevich.

13

to?

>d

sure

and to the courts.

7

10

education

slim.

I miss one?

And let me see.

Next is Kathleen

Okay.

Where did I get

Winn; next is Nathan

1

R o s e n k r a n t z ; next

is Linda L.

2

Is that

3

M S . PALACIOS:

4

THE COURT:

5

have

selected

Sandstrom.

it there?
Y e s , Your

Is that the

Honor.
jurors as you

them?

6

MR. MACDOUGALL:

7

THE COURT:

8

t i m e , then, that the others be excused.

9

can have the jurors

10

Y e s , it is.

I guess

sworn.

it's proper at this
And then

So, all the o t h e r s ,

we

I'd

like to thank you very much for being here with us.

11

The bailiff will

12

you come back, you must remain

13

time so that the attorneys will know who you are.

14

If you could

seat you so that

in those seats all

stand

and be

15

(Jury

16

the

sworn?
Sworn)

At this time, we will excuse you.

17

tomorrow

18

statement

19

believe

morning we will proceed
and the introduction

with the

Is that correct?

And

opening

of the evidence.

that we can resume at 10:00 tomorrow

>0
>1

when

I

morning.

We can start at

9:30

if --

\2

M S . WELLS:

\3

conflict

'4

don't

in another

know

when

Your Honor, I have a

court between

that will be

9:00

finished.

and 9:30, and I

1

10:00, then.

2

So, tomorrow

morning

at 10:00

o'clock,

3

if you can be here before

4

resume on time.

5

statements, and then we'll proceed, as I indicated

6

when I was explaining

7

wouId

We will start with the

to you the procedures

Is there any other matters
should

handle at this

MR. MACDOUGALL:

11

THE C O U R T :
admonish

13

anyone regarding

14

or neighbors

15

approach

16

you cannot

17

persist, walk away

18

please do not expose

19

television, radio, newspapers

20

that understood?

21

that does not understand

22

The record

24

that we

No, Your Honor.

If not, I just want to

12

hand.

that we

time?

10

23

opening

foilow.

8
9

that time so that we can

you, again, that you are not to talk
this case, family

or anyone

else.

you, tell them

with

members, relatives

If anyone

should

that you are on jury duty

talk about this case.

If they

should

and report that to the Court.
yourself

If there's

to any publicity
or anything

else.

for this
(Jury

Is
anyone

record?

shows no one has raised

So, you may be excused

And

from

none -- if there's

that, please

and

evening.
Excused)

their

1

benefit

of the record

2

after

MS. WELLS:

the

jury

--

Your Honor, we would

3

like the record

to indicate that we are not

4

our cause challenges

5

jurors

6

challenges.

7

one that we did not exercise a preemptory

8

did

9

an appeal

that we previously

upon which we did n.ot exercise
I think, specifically,

challenge

for cause.

just

waiving

made to any

our

preemptory

Alternate

No. 1 is

on that we

We are not waiving

that on

issue.

10

But, the reason

11

is:

Given

the entire pool

12

was our decision

13

should

14

si tuation.

that we did not do that

that we had before u s , it

that perhaps

there are others that we

take off given their order and

15

We'd also
that the Court's

like the Court

16

record

17

motions

18

exercise

19

eight

20

preemptories

21

the Court had granted

22

Defense

23

we are entitled

24

so, we believe that the requirement

with respect

failure

to the

on those same

our

I believe

the

for-cause

jurors has caused

jurors.

us to

they

are

exercised

on that we ordinarily
our motion.

would

not have if

And, in fact, the

four preemptory

to exercise

entire

to note for

to grant

of them that we believe we

ends up having

the

challenges

in the capital

case.

of doing

that
And

that has

1

being

-- exercising

2

jury, because we are

and having

a fair and

limited to four

preemptories.

3

THE COURT:

The

4

MR. J O N E S :

No response.

5

THE COURT:

6

the record, those

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

State?

.Okay.

It will be noted

for

objections.

Okay.
o'clock.

impartial

Then, tomorrow

We will resume

morning

at

then.

We will be in recess until
(Trial Continued

then.

to 2-18-88.)

10:00
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